US POLICY TOWARDS IRAN UNDER TRUMP 2.0

When Donald Trump first came to power as President of the US in Jan 2017, it was clear that he would target Iran and work on regime change through a strategy of diplomacy and coercion without necessarily going militarily ballistic. That is exactly what he did.  He withdrew the US from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), also known as the Iran nuclear deal, in May 2018. This move was aimed at pressuring Iran to renegotiate the deal and address other US concerns.

The latter extended to Iran’s support for terrorism triggering the demand to declare it a terrorist supporting state. The fact that Iran’s proxies, which spread far and wide in the Levant, went as deep south as Yemen and gave it disproportionate power, also drew the US ire. The theological rule, lack of democracy and questionable human rights, especially related to women, were all aspects that were anathema to the US establishment and its chosen path of bringing most of the world closer to the ideology of liberal democracy.

There were many other nations similarly disposed against US hegemony which had been neutralized in the past, Libya being the most recent. Some had ideological leanings that did not match US interests, but their political pursuits did not pose any major perceived threat to US interests. Prime among them were the kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and several other Gulf nations besides Egypt. Primarily it was Iran and its cohorts which were seen by the US establishment as a threat.

US-Iran Relations in the Pre 1979 Era

Before dwelling on the threat perception as viewed by Trump 1.0 and likely to be viewed by Trump 2.0 as well, it would be in order to trace how a flourishing Iran-US relationship of the 50s to the 70s came to become one of the world’s most deadly rivalries. Till 1979 Iran and the US enjoyed a wholesome relationship of cooperation for mutual interests.  Iran was a major supplier of oil to the US and its allies, and the relationship ensured a stable flow of energy resources during a time of global reliance on Middle Eastern oil. The Shah used oil revenues to modernise Iran’s economy, and US corporations benefited from contracts in infrastructure, defence, and industry.

The US sold advanced weaponry to Iran, making it one of the largest recipients of American arms during this period. The Shah’s regime was considered a regional “policeman” for the US, tasked with maintaining stability in the Persian Gulf after the British withdrawal in the early 1970s. More than anything else it was the autocratic rule of Reza Pahlavi Shah of Iran which led to his overthrow by a popular revolution which came to be dominated by two themes.

First, it brought the Iranian clergy to power and second, as a consequence of the first, an overt Shia Islamic domination of the ideological and theological discourse of the nation came into place.

The new leadership adopted a hugely anti US stance due to the latter’s support to the deposed Shah and for the support it extended to the state of Israel without any commensurate effort to find an equitable solution to the Palestinian problem. Iran, as a Shia theological state, in direct opposition to the Sunni Saudi Arabian and the Gulf sheikhdoms, chose to be more anti-Israel than any other Middle Eastern state. It thus assumed the lead in the struggle against Israel as against the relatively low-profile anti-Israel stance of many of the Arab states. That was in direct conflict against US interests.

The relationship had deteriorated as a result of the 54 US hostages taken by Iran after students stormed the US embassy in Tehran on 4 Nov 1979. The 444 days hostage crisis deeply affected US-Iran relations and had a lasting impact on both nations’ political landscapes over the next forty years and continues to the day.

The Iranian Threat

The Iranian threat has been always viewed primarily from two angles. Its ballistic missile program and nuclear weapon ambition on one hand, and its role in supporting terrorist groups which acted as its proxies in major parts of the Middle East, on the other, affording an out of proportion strategic strength. The US has always felt that it’s only a regime change in Tehran which will bring Iran into line with US interests. The Obama Administration had signed the JCPOA in Jul 2015 which sought to limit Iranian nuclear ambitions. The agreement focused solely on limiting Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief, without any mention about the ballistic missile program.

Trump in the first avatar as President argued that the sanctions relief provided by the JCPOA gave Iran significant financial resources to fund various destabilizing activities and therefore withdrew the US from the agreement and tightened the sanctions. Already deeply committed to the war in Afghanistan, Trump believed he could negotiate a broader and stricter agreement that addressed not just Iran’s nuclear program but also its ballistic missile development, support for proxy groups and the larger strategic behaviour which he felt disfavoured US interests.

Iran’s support for proxy groups (like Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis) and influence in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon was perceived as vital to its security doctrine and regional dominance. These activities were not abandoned, even under economic strain. The people suffered huge economic privation, but the leadership and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) worked in the spirit of sacrifice, a typical Shia Islam approach towards strategic challenge and withstood the sanctions quite effectively.

The ballistic missile program remained on course and in due course Iran also became one of the world’s leading nations in the manufacture and export of drones. Its diplomatic proactiveness ensured that its relationship with China and Russia remained on even keel.  Iran partially withstood US sanctions by strengthening its relationships with China and Russia, including through a significant Iran-China strategic agreement and closer economic and military cooperation with Russia. These partnerships provided Iran with avenues to mitigate the economic and political impact of the US campaign.

The strange and complex configuration of enmities and partnerships in the Middle East ensured that the Iranian campaign, with the Iraqi Shia militias in tow, against ISIS (Daesh) helped neutralize the most dangerous Sunni Islamist terror group and thereby helped the US and several other pro-US nations.

The Current Situation

Alongside the latest US presidential election, we have witnessed the near collapse of Iranian proxy capability with the large-scale attrition of the Hamas and Hezbollah leadership at the hands of the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF). The fall of the Bashir Assad regime in Syria has virtually cut off Iranian influence from a major part of the Levant. The Hayat e Tahrir e Shams (HTS) which has captured power in Syria is a Sunni organisation which has yet to show its true colours.

Initial US contacts with it appear to reveal that it does not wish to go the Daesh way and is actually sworn against radical elements hellbent on the creation of chaos and turbulence in the Levant. Turkey is yet watching the situation to assess whether HTS would have any truck with the Kurdish rebel forces. Iran is weakened to a great extent and the ability of the IRGC to run an effective proxies’ campaign may well be questionable. Russia is stalling for time and wishes only to retain its presence in the port of Latakia and the  Khmeimim Air Base in Syria while it is deeply involved in the war in Ukraine.

Internally Iran’s loss of a key ally like Assad undermines the regime’s narrative of regional resistance and could exacerbate domestic discontent. Already facing economic challenges and public protests, the regime may encounter increased criticism over its foreign interventions, especially given the substantial resources invested in supporting Assad.

The Trump Options

The Trump 2.0 Administration is likely to be faced by a situation of strategic confusion in the Middle East. Donald Trump has already made it known that “Syria is not our fight”. How will he therefore approach the relationship with Iran? It’s clear that the approach cannot be isolated from the situation in the rest of the Middle East.  In effect, he has three options.

First with Iran at its weakest, go for the jugular in conjunction with Israel and defeat Iran’s larger military and strategic ambition. This won’t be easy at all. With Israel’s focus on finishing Hamas and Hezbollah any premature entry into a third front will not be possible and if at all it will be counterproductive.   Trump is clear in his intent. He wishes to stay away from unnecessary wars including Israel’s wars which he will try to wind down. This is therefore a no-go.

Second, while supporting Israel’s right to self-defence, Trump 2.0 may also encourage it to exercise restraint in its dealings with Iran and its proxies, preferring negotiations rather than confrontation. Despite the tough rhetoric, Trump 2.0 may explore diplomatic channels to engage with Iran, potentially leading to a new round of negotiations on the nuclear issue or other areas of concern. The last time Trump wanted it but continued to hedge on it and that could be the fate this time too.

The third option would be – strong support for Israel with focus on targeting the proxies including the IRGC and the Houthis without engaging in a general war. However, this would always carry the feasibility of escalating into something less controllable.  

The Trump 2.0 policy towards Iran could therefore be shaped by a mix of diplomatic, economic, and military tools, with a focus on protecting US interests and avoiding global conflict. This seems more likely given Iran’s Russia and China connections. Trump would not like any situation in which there is enhancement of US troops presence in the Middle East. However, covert efforts at organizing resistance from within Iran will continue although there are no clear indicators of the weakening of the clergy-based leadership.  All sanctions are likely to remain in place.

The main players in the US scheme of things will be Israel, Saudi Arabia, UAE and Turkey. It will keep a hawk’s eye over Syria and especially the activities of the HTS government. What it has also to guard against is the extreme possibility of efforts of revival of Islamist groups such as Daesh which yet exist in pockets of the civil war ridden Syrian territory. Many migrants will attempt to return and also add to the confusion as the potential immigration of radicals could take place under this garb.  

Lastly, although US efforts at regime change in Tehran will continue it is unlikely that a revolution of sorts is in the making there. The Russia-China interest and support continues to be strong and the US reluctance to get involved in overseas battles will prevent it militarily engaging Iran. Post the Israeli completion of the Gaza campaign the Israel-US combine would probably work on consolidation and not on further confrontation. We may actually be approaching an era in the Middle East where there could be relative peace awaiting the next inevitable eruption which is unlikely to occur in Trump’s presidency.