THE LIGHT ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE DISENGAGEMENT TUNNEL

On October 21 this year, in a somewhat surprising turn of events, India and China reached an agreement to disengage forces along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), where violence had erupted in 2020, leading to fatalities on both sides. In December 2022, another conflagration occurred in the Tawang Sector, marking a further dip in India’s bilateral relationship with its powerful neighbour. Since then, tensions have continued to simmer while both countries began reinforcing their existing troop formations and building new border infrastructure.
India and China have discussed the issues arising from the conflict on several diplomatic and military forums for over four years. These discussions were limited in scope and can be characterised as the first steps of a long road to normalisation. These were only focused on restoring unwritten patrolling norms before the bloody hand-to-hand clashes at Galwan.

Still, the agreement codifying patrolling protocol in the Depsang and Demchok regions—the areas most affected by China’s salami-slicing tactics of 2020—marks a welcome movement in the right direction. It reopens the doors for both armies to patrol up to the ‘border points’ of their respective perceptions. For the Indian Army, this would result in reverting to the pre-Galwan patrolling arrangements up to Patrolling Point (PP) 10 to 13 in the Depsang and the Charding nullah of Demchok.

Significantly, the description of the agreement varied in the Indian and Chinese diplomatic readouts. The latter’s reaction was markedly muted; after Prime Minister Modi—Xi Jinping meeting on the sidelines of the BRICS summit at Kazan, the Indian leader was reported to have “welcomed” the agreement. At the same time, the Chinese statement merely noted that the two leaders had ‘commended the important progress’.

The disengagement agreement is a vital step in a ladder, the next two rungs being de-escalation and de-induction. It represents the first glimmer of hope that progress may be possible over the intractable border issue, a legacy of British India.
Is this the proverbial light at the end of the tunnel? A moment that must evoke optimism for India-China relations in the coming years?
We must recall the contours and trajectories of the past to arrive at convincing answers to the above questions. History often carries indicators for the future. That is even more valid in the case of a country like China, which bases a great deal of its geopolitical and domestic thought on its past.

The dispute stems from colonial-era border delineations handed over to independent India, treaties the Chinese claim as ‘unratified’. As per Maxwell (India’s China War), efforts to formalise borders between India and China fell through after the Nehru government insisted that there was nothing to ‘negotiate’. This sentiment was also expressed to the Chinese in Nehru’s letters to Premier Zhou Enlai. Speaking in the parliament, when a member pointed out to the then Prime Minister Nehru that the Chinese maps were showing parts of India in China, he had replied, “Our maps show that the McMahon Line is our boundary, and that is our boundary— map or no map. That fact remains, and we stand by that boundary and will not allow anybody to come across that boundary.” That was not the Chinese view, and they repeatedly let India know it. Arguably, the 1962 war with China was an occurrence that could have been predicted. Unfortunately, the Indian polity was caught asleep on the wheel, leading to a traumatic defeat despite the heroic resistance of the Indian soldiers.

The 3488-km-long LAC has remained largely peaceful since then. There have been no artillery exchanges that characterised the Line of Control between India and Pakistan for several years. But that does not imply that the Chinese have continued to respect the status quo. The Chinese have repeatedly violated the LAC. Clashes took place in 1967 between Nathu La and Cho La, causing casualties to both sides; in 1975, four Indian soldiers were killed in a Chinese ambush at Tulung La; in 1986-87, the Chinese moved into the un-held area of Sumdorong Chu (Wangdung) in Arunachal Pradesh, leading to the Indian Army taking up forward positions and going into a prolonged standoff; in 2013 the Chinese set up a camp at Depsang 19 km inside Indian-held Ladakh, before dismantling it after three weeks, in 2014 several Chinese troops crossed into the Chumar-Demchok area while Xi Jinping was on a state visit to India and in 2017, a 73-day standoff between the two armies took place at Doklam. What transpired at Galwan and Tawang is not a ‘Black Swan’ event but a continuation of the Chinese policy of not letting the issue be placed on the back burner, much less settling it permanently through negotiations.

As a young officer, I was the ‘secretary’ of a Border Persons Meeting with the Chinese at Bum La. I distinctly remember that throughout the meeting, the Chinese officers were warm and hospitable (the meeting was ‘across’ the LAC), but in the end, in what was scripted theatre, they whipped out a statement that threatened the Indian Army unless it dismantled fortifications and vacated Chinese territory. Once that statement had been read and discussed, they reverted to the conviviality! It was plain as daylight that this was a deliberate move to minute the border issue into the proceedings, thus keeping it alive.

If the Chinese are so disinclined to settle, why have they now reached a disengagement agreement with India? And how should we respond to the ‘outbreak of peace’?

A few days ago, speaking on the Today channel in a discussion (which I, too, participated in), former Foreign Secretary Kanwal Sibal candidly remarked that, beyond educated guesses, we don’t understand the Chinese motivation for agreeing to disengage. It could be an outcome of several ‘compulsions’, or it could simply be a symbolic gesture before the BRICS Summit.

Of course, the two countries’ finding of common ground is a welcome development. The agreement could lead to an incipient normalisation of political and economic relations, such as resumed direct flights and trade activities curtailed post-Galwan. The BRICS meeting between the two leaders indicated a willingness to engage diplomatically.

But every past indicator gives us one unshakable conclusion: it is time to make haste slowly. Experts in India have correctly read the situation and expressed cautious optimism. This has been further validated by the marked difference in the importance accorded to the agreement in the readouts of the two countries.

To achieve long-term stability, underlying issues of potential conflict, such as infrastructure development along the LAC and establishing clear communication channels, must be addressed.

This is neither a moment for euphoria nor complacency. The agreement to disengage is a small symbolic step – the stages of de-escalation and de-induction are not yet on the horizon. Meanwhile, we must not lower our diplomatic, economic or military guard. The government’s current policies display strength while keeping the door of friendship open. These must continue. Militarily, we must not abandon the push towards increased readiness along the Northern and Eastern borders. Infrastructure development for the LAC and the states bordering China should remain priorities. On the world stage, our participation in Quad and growing relationship with Australia, Japan, the US, and Russia are all steps that work as a diplomatic bulwark against Chinese adventurism.

Meanwhile, when dealing with China, we must not forget that the light at the end of the tunnel may be a glimmer of ‘hope’—but it could also be a train hurtling towards us to blindside us.