THE GLACIERS IN CONTENTION: SHOULD OUR STANCE CHANGE?

Having been there, done that, qualifies many of us to express opinion on tricky operational strategic issues. I lay claim to the fact that I am one of those who has written extensively on the Siachen Glacier complex and attempted to bring the several connected nuances to public notice. This includes full justification of the continued Indian insistence on remaining in occupation of that terrain. People are better geared today to appreciate initiatives or the rejection of them.

As time has progressed, I find myself now actually on both sides of the division of opinion that exists regarding the necessity or otherwise of physically deploying our soldiers in the snowy wasteland of the glaciers in Ladakh’s Karakoram area. There is a conservative but somewhat idealist point of view that wishes to see an arrangement by which both India and Pakistan withdraw their forces from the various glaciers in the area and convert the zone into a high-altitude bio-diversity park; this quite aside from the continuing Pakistan sponsored proxy hybrid war in J&K. On the other hand, there is a realist view that we can ill afford to trust Pakistan with any agreement and cannot start inviting third party guarantees from the UN or any other entity simply because it would open up a whole Pandora’s box on the ‘mutuality’ issue enshrined in the Shimla Agreement of July 1972.  

This issue has very sensibly been thrown up by Mission Victory India (MVI), an Indian think tank, with an explanation on why a debate is warranted on the issue of an ‘agreed upon’ mutual withdrawal from the glaciated region, or the persistence of deployment in that part of Ladakh, in and around the Siachen glacier (the article that proposes the debate is at the link https://www.missionvictoryindia.in/post/siachen-a-strategic-serenity-space). It’s a welcome sign that alternative thinking to the usual cliched thought process is being sought. Many with or without experience of serving in the areas will no doubt express their views, and one respects all those. I won’t go into explaining the arguments of MVI regarding withdrawal, but I will express my opinion from both angles.

As someone long inclined to oppose any steps towards withdrawal of the Indian Army from the tactically favourable deployment it occupies at the Saltoro Ridge, which with its jagged heights guards the much lower Siachen glacier, am I now taking an opposite point of view?   

I need to start with the basis of my argument that continues to hold good, as regards continued deployment. I am not presenting a detailed map with this article, only a sketch which would need to be used to build up an imagination of the environment. My first point has always been the trust deficit.

In Kargil, way back in 1996, a very respected commander of the Kargil Brigade explained to me what he called the unwritten agreement about ‘traditional gaps’; that term actually came from the large front of Kargil sector, then held by just a brigade with five battalions. The resultant gaps in deployment were never to be exploited by either side as per the then Commander Kargil Brigade. It was supposed to be a convention based upon trust; the same convention by which we withdrew troops from ‘winter vacated’ posts, leaving them open and vulnerable to occupation by the other side once the snows started to melt. Musharraf destroyed that little bit of gentlemanly trust that existed between the two armies by launching Operation Badr in 1999 which resulted in the Pakistan Army occupying the Indian winter vacated posts.

 So, if we agree to another of those gentleman’s agreements to mutually withdraw from the glaciers, we should be clear what we are giving up and what Pakistan is gaining. Which Pakistani General will not wish to leave behind a legacy of outwitting India and regaining operational strategic advantage. The public should know the rationale of the insistence of the Indian Army brass. First, the fact that it is the Indian Army which occupies Siachen glacier and the heights along the southern flanking range called the Saltoro range.

Pakistan occupies several glaciers in the region including Baltoro and the Chumik glaciers, but these offer no distinct tactical advantage as the one offered by India’s Saltoro range deployment which guards and gives tactical depth to the Siachen glacier. The Pakistan Army is extremely embarrassed about this and publicly it has never admitted that it is not occupying the Siachen glacier; in fact, it cannot even view it.  Thus, if there is a mutual withdrawal it is the Indian Army which will pull back from dominating heights of Saltoro and probably from the Siachen Glacier itself.

The Indian deployment would then be at much lower heights in the region where the spout of the Siachen glacier exists, near the old Base Camp. Similar would be the fate of the Central and Southern Glacier deployment where tactically dominant ground would need to be vacated under a gentlemen’s mutual agreement. Can the trust deficit permit this?

Hypothetically, even if it does permit and there is a breach of trust by Pakistan, much like the Kargil episode, not only can we not defend the main Siachen glacier but also, we may not be in a position to defend the Nubra valley through which the River Nubra flows 90 kilometres before merging with the Shyok River. The Shyok River then drains into the Indus River providing Pakistan its agriculture life line. Pakistan would always wish to have the source of the Nubra (Siachen glacier) under its control to avoid any future contingency by which India could arm twist it on the basis of the availability of waters for the River Indus. In addition, if ordered to retake the Siachen heights or the Saltoro range it would amount to a campaign that could last months if not years and entail unmentionable quantum of casualties.

There is another argument against an Indian withdrawal. In today’s context or at least after the year 2020 the aggressive Chinese design resulted in a mirror deployment of 50,000 plus Indian troops along the Line of Actual Control. The crow flight distance from Siachen Heights near the Old Base Camp to the Karakoram Pass is not as much as we like to imagine for our comfort level; neither is it to Depsang opposite Daulat Beg Oldi (DBO). If the Indian deployment in the glacier region is withdrawn the Pakistan Army has almost a clear run of unoccupied territory awaiting occupation to create continuity of deployment with the PLA. For India it would be a sure give away.

A detailed examination of the terrain configuration would indicate that if the Nubra valley cannot be defended due to a breach of trust, neither can the Shyok valley if the Chinese PLA decides to undertake large scale operations in conjunction with the Pakistan Army. Our strongest line of defence would then be at the Ladakh Range behind which lies Leh, the capital of Ladakh. Tactical and operational prudence demands that capital cities are not defended by deploying just one layer of defences ahead of them to provide depth.

Pakistan has been more than keen to manoeuvre an agreement for ‘mutual withdrawal’ from the glaciated region although it spends far less than India’s average of Rs 1500 crores (2016 figure) per year. However, Indian withdrawal gets the Pakistan government and the Pakistan Army a reprieve from the sequence of embarrassments that have come their way. It also gives them the potential of acting upon a contingency   where the Pakistan Army and the PLA can work hand in hand much more closely to the detriment of Indian national interest.

There is another rather simplistic argument. We have a Joint Resolution of the two houses of Parliament and all political parties, dated 22 Feb 1994. This declares that all territories held under the control of the former kingdom of J&K belong to India and India will strive to bring them back to our control. Siachen forms a part of these territories and any withdrawal from there which will give tactical advantage to Pakistan will be against the spirit of the Resolution.

Can we throw all these arguments out of the window on the pretext that these allude to old time realities; that the environment has changed drastically and that a peace dividend must emerge.   How far can a risk be taken? Waiting for J&K to be resolved and then executing a withdrawal is the easiest option because that would postpone a decision by a couple of generations.

However, the strategic significance of the Siachen zone has also been adequately explained above, especially in the context of the defensibility of the Nubra and Shyok valleys, as also the issue of continuum of territory between the PLA and the Pakistan Army. All the above can be risked only if there is a clearly verifiable mechanism about withdrawal and then the non-violability of the agreement is minimized through technical and international guarantee. The latter would become a sticky point, in view of the Shimla Agreement, and open up a Pandora’s box.

The protagonists of this have to work around it and make it acceptable, if it has to be made workable. I do agree that the pursuits of peace will not bring overnight results. Let Pakistan therefore propose more ideas and thoughts. It’s only through that route that something workable will emerge. They will be hugely frustrated as we proceed because India cannot relent transactionally; it does not matter, for politeness is not something that geopolitical posturing demands.   

I did promise the readership that my views would be expressed on both sides of the divided opinion. Losing lives to weather and terrain and expending a couple of crores of rupees because of an existing trust deficit may not be a very rational action on our part. However, that trust can only be restored when both nations make the effort; it cannot be one sided. We cannot delink this from J&K even though we may wish to. If Pakistan wishes to see movement towards a Siachen withdrawal it has to take action to dilute the trust deficit. That can happen only in two ways; first through some demonstrated seriousness about ensuring that violence in J&K ebbs and second through a restoration of ties. Both these are unlikely in view of the stonewalling by the Pakistan Army whose military ego will not permit it to relent.