OPERATIONALISING ACT EAST POLICY THROUGH NORTHEAST

India recently celebrated 10th anniversary of Act East policy. PM Modi visited Singapore, Brunei and Laos in Sept-Oct 2024. He also attended the 21st ASEAN-India Summit and the 19th East Asia Summit. Yet, the worsening and adversarial geo-strategic environment in the neighbourhood, especially Bangladesh and Myanmar, as also continued unrest in Manipur and in pockets of Nagaland mandate the harsh reality-check on current status of this policy.

It is relevant to reiterate that one of the key stated mission objectives of Viksit-Bharat-2047, relates to Operationalisation of Act East policy. It is also an appropriate occasion as December is the month of Horn Bill and Christmas in North-East (NE) is the most relevant time to take stock and reflect, when focus of rest of India, even if temporarily is across the Brahmaputra and the year-end mood is reflective.

Evolution and Framework

Mainland India, term utilised reluctantly, only to drive home the point on the theme of this article has rather checkered record in its dealings with NE. It is best summed up in misuse of term ‘Purabaiya’, implying person from East. All and sundry, starting from Eastern UP have been bundled in this category. HQ of Eastern Command of Army was located in Lucknow and moved to Kolkata, only after the Chinese shock, in May 1963. Parts of NE like erstwhile Northeast Frontier Agency, later Arunachal and Naga HillsTuensang Area (NHTA) were governed by Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) till creation of Nagaland and Arunachal Pradesh. India hesitatingly initiated ‘Think-East’ policy in late 80s, which was later upgraded to ‘Look-East’ by PV Narsimha Rao regime in 1991. The policy was followed through in subsequent AB Vajpayee and Manmohan Singh governments. However, in 2014, PM Narendra Modi, sought to revitalize it in new rebranded format of ‘Act-East’ policy.

Policy was designed to tap into and integrate with geo-economic network and template of connectivity, trade, tourism and manufacturing, existing in the adjoining extended neighborhood. Ideally, it envisages development of mutually beneficial economic order/network. Few such formulations include sharing of surplus hydropower, bamboo, honey, tea economy and Buddhist tourism. In essence, it aimed to link NE region of India, Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, Myanmar extending to Thailand and other Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries, dubbed as ‘Tiger’ economies. Bangladesh- China-India-Myanmar (BCIM) corridor, signature connectivity project was proposed to develop shared economic future. Economics apart, the region has had cultural and theological linkages, forged through maritime corridors, spreading Buddhism and Ramayana culture into ASEAN region.

Act-East through Northeast

NE and peninsular India are the geo-economic pivots for operationalization of Act East. Out of these pivots, NE has primacy and is the main driver due to contiguity. The policy aims to act as a catalyst and enabling mechanism to promote development in NE. The first critical requirement is to develop better understanding and appreciation of the region and its diversity. Winston Churchill’s oft repeated quote, “it is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma” can be utilized to describe NE. It has significant amount of diversity with rest of India in terms of anthropology-ethnicity and tribes; theological beliefs and religion; socio-cultural norms, dress and customs; land ownership and agricultural practices; just to name important aspects. Physical distances are such that tea gardens in NE followed their on time zones, more aligned with Bangladesh and Bhutan, which have variation of 30 mins from Indian Standard Time (IST). The post Independence formulation devised by noted anthropologist, Verrier Elwin advocating insularity has given way to increasing integration with mainstream. It will be in order to preserve local customs and values duly modified based on societal consensus. Ideally, the system should transit to mutual dependency from the current patron-client relationship. The green shoots of this are taking shape through induction of large number of people in service, retail, hospitality and tourism sectors, employed outside in metropolitan cities, leveraging their soft skills.

While looking outwards and on regional plane, the policy pre-supposed stability in security environment and resolution of ongoing insurgencies. While many movements in Mizoram, Assam (Bodo and ULFA), Tripura, Meghalaya and Gorkhaland have been capped, yet Naga insurgency, the proverbial Gordian knot of NE, is still to be fully resolved. Meanwhile, Manipur is witnessing ethnic war between Kukis and Meiteis. The situation has been exacerbated by multiple insurgencies in adjoining Myanmar and its attendant demographic outflow in NE, with influx of Chin and Rohingya refugees. The region has pockets of high-density demography like in Bangladesh, forcing sort of lebensraum and illegal economic migration outwards. Influx of refugees and illegal migrants has generated challenges, like altering demographic balance in sensitive border districts. Frequent cyclones, tsunamis and specter of rising sea levels have added to adversarial environment and frequent bouts of death and destruction.

Dragon’s Shadow -Clash of Connectivity

Chinese revanchist policy, proclaimed by Mao-Tse-Tung in the format of Tibetan palm with fingers extending outwards to include Ladakh, Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan and Arunachal threaten sovereignty of other neighbors. China is yet to settle land borders with India and Bhutan, despite protracted negotiations. It has made extensive claims, renamed places and is creating Xiaokangs, border villages. Concurrently, China has tried to build dependencies and leverages by rolling-out variants of Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), in form of economic corridors like China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) and China-Nepal Economic Corridor (CNEC). The traditional and natural connectivity matrix was based on Kolkata, as maritime gateways for land-locked neighbours like Nepal and Bhutan. Till 60s and Sino-Indian war, rice and other commodities were imported by Tibet from Kolkata. Much has changed with China planning and even executing topography defying surface (rail/road) corridors from Chinese hinterland to outlying territories of Tibet, traversing high-altitude region. It aims to extend these into Nepal, Bhutan and Myanmar and link them to Chinese supply chains.

Accompanying the surface connectivity juggernaut is growing Chinese grid-lock in Bay of Bengal, described as ‘string of pearls’. Cox’s Bazar, Kyaukphyu, Ream, Hambantota, Feydhoo Islands (Maldives) are not only ports of call but also instruments of power-projection. At the very heart is the objective, to overcome strategic vulnerability of Malacca Straits. China is also pushing for resolving her Malacca dilemma by creating Kra canal through Thailand, to bypass this narrow passage. Security situation and threat of dumping of Chinese products in already Chinese dominated markets has imposed caution on India. Consequently, India pulled back from signing Regional Comprehensive Economic Pact with ASEAN. Does this imply- Act East but set-up guard rails against the Dragon’s economic domination? The complexity is accentuated with Vietnam despite fighting war and being at the receiving end of ongoing maritime contestation in South China Sea, further strengthening supply chains with China. Connectivity is acquiring new variants and is becoming multi-domain, covering digital, power-grids, pipe-lines, health and tourism.

In the American engineered push-back policy of re-location of manufacturing through China plus One policy, Vietnam and Indonesia are strong competitors, with Vietnam seeming to have an edge over others currently. Hence, within Act-East, it is uneasy shared space of co-operation, competition and even contestation amongst member states. It is also the region, where regional organizations except ASEAN are dysfunctional and literally on ventilator. The list of these bodies includes Bhutan Bangladesh India Nepal (BBIN) and Mekong-Ganga Cooperation, only BIMSTEC spurts to life but only occasionally and for brief spells. NE is also facing prospects of water wars likely to be unleashed with construction of mega dam on Tsangpo (Brahmaputra) at Zangbo Yarlung (Great Bend), which has major implications for Bangladesh and India. India is seeking to mitigate potential disaster by building dam cum reservoir on Subansiri river.

Siliguri Corridor-Tenuous Link

India’s link to NE (also described as Seven Sisters and One Brother) is through narrow Siliguri Corridor (approximately 18 km, at the narrowest) and Dragon’s Dolam (Chinese call it Doklam) ominous shadow. India’s rail-road corridor, pipelines, power and communication grid runs through corridor. India had proposed creation of Tetuliya surface corridor to create redundancy and reduce vulnerability. The complexity and challenges are magnified due to demography and latent separatist movements like Kamatapur (Rajbongshi) and Gorkhaland. The North Bengal region with Siliguri as hub is emerging as economic hub with trading, tea, tourism, medical and education facilities, which have clientele in neighbouring Eastern Nepal, North-Western Bangladesh and Bhutan. The famous apparel export trade of Bangladesh sources almost entire raw materials cotton and yarn from India. In addition, it banks on techno-commercial network of India. Even in Nepal, Chinese funded and aided power plants utilise Indian power distribution companies.

The efforts to forge alternate maritime connectivity between Kolkata and Sittwe port in Myanmar and onwards to Zorakhtwar in Meghalaya, utilizing multi-modal (maritime, road and riverine) Kaladan link, have been stalled for nearly two decades. The project did make some progress recently but is currently stalled due to internal chaos in Myanmar. There is also uncertainty on surface connectivity projects, anchored on restoration of rail-links between India and Bangladesh, which were executed only recently. The unfortunate swing between pro-India (Sheikh Hasina) and anti-India regimes (Begum Khaleda Zia, Gen Ershad and current regime of Mohammad Yunus) coupled with instability in Myanmar mandate building multiple connectivities and creating bilateral/multilateral stakes in these links. Unfortunately, most plans remain on drawing boards, while China has managed to push her projects through creating strong presence in this region.

Ten Point Plan

PM Narendra Modi in his recent visit to Laos has laid out an ambitious agenda with ten-point action plan under the summit theme of ‘enhancing connectivity and resilience’. The action plan includes –celebrating 2015 as ASEAN-India year of tourism with India providing funding of US $5 million for joint activities. It also proposes celebration of decade of Act East policy with people centric activities. The proposed list includes- Youth Summit; Start-up Festival; Hackathon; Music Festival; ASEAN-India network of think tanks and Delhi Dialogue; ASEAN-India Women Scientists conclave under ASEAN-India Science and Technology Development Fund; doubling number of scholarships in Nalanda University and provision of new ASEAN scholarships in agricultural universities in India.

Besides these measures, it is proposed to review ASEAN-India Trade in Goods Agreement by 2025; enhancing Disaster Resilience with US $5 million funding by India; new Health Ministers Track towards Health Resilience; initiating ASEAN-India Cyber Policy Dialogue to strengthen Digital and Cyber Resilience; workshop on Green Hydrogen and invitation to ASEAN leaders to join ‘Plant a Tree for Mother’ campaign towards Climate Resilience.

Way Forward

An objective appraisal leads to inference that action plan and agenda are loaded with symbolic exploratory initiatives. Most proposals are is soft power domain and would require backing in ramping-up connectivity, trade and joint ventures. Though symbolic, they hold promise of opening new avenues. However, on balance, the essence lies in converting promises into time bound implementation. A complementary plan and agenda for NE is warranted with focus on revitalisation of governance structures like Department of North-East Region (DONER) and Northeast Council. It will also be prudent to invest in regional organizations like BBIN, BIMSTEC and Mekong-Ganga Cooperation.

The current flux in region characterized by anti-India environment in Bangladesh and not so friendly governments in Nepal, Sri Lanka and Maldives, pose complex challenges. It calls for nimble diplomacy, while sticking to long-term commitment to Act-East policy. India faces concurrent challenges of multi-domain connectivity with and beyond NE. As we strengthen our outreach, concurrently it is important to expedite conflict resolution in NE. It is also equally critical to resolve connectivity paradigm to ensure multiple connectivities with in-built redundancies. The bottom line is Act East through geo-economic pivot of NE.