INDIA-CHINA RELATIONS: THE NEW MODUS VIVENDI

The Economic Survey 2024 had in fact suggested that India should consider Chinese foreign direct investment to help boost exports, manufacturing, and reduce imports from China. The survey also recommends that India strike a balance between importing goods from China and attracting Chinese FDI. Indian Express in a lead article on November 12, 2024, alluded to commencement of direct flights between India and China, easing of visa curbs on Chinese nationals, lifting on ban on mobile apps, letting Chinese journalists come to India and allowing more Indian movies in Chinese theatres.

Indeed, India-China relationship is exceedingly complex. India’s maximum imports come from China, and there is an ever-increasing trade deficit. India and China are also negotiating, with strong Indian impulse holding out hope for a return to more normal relations with China. Hence, Indian and Chinese negotiators arriving at an Agreement on disengagement at Demchok and Depsang, and patrolling arrangements along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), is a step in the right direction. The modus vivendi arrived at on the LAC, after four and a half years of Chinese expansionism, needs to be re-examined. Four significant facers are considered.

One, India and China are civilisational states and should be able to resolve differences with maturity. The recent end of the politico-diplomatic impasse between India and China is an immensely positive development, which must be welcomed. It led to a meeting between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the BRICS Summit at Kazan in Russia. The official statements indicate that the latest agreement marked completion of disengagement, return to status of 2020 and commencement of patrolling in Depsang and Demchok. India welcomed the recent ‘agreement’ for complete disengagement and resolution of Chinese expansionism of 2020. Commencement of political dialogue at the highest level and between special representatives are solid steps forward.

China, without referring to agreement or patrolling, has stated that it would maintain close communication through diplomatic and military channels on handling issues related to the border situation. Chinese responses tend to convey a somewhat contrarian picture, however. CCTV the Chinese state media outlet which is part of the China Media Group, in a significant comment on WeChat stated, “…Indian sides misunderstanding that China would make concessions. However, as the PLA always stood firm on the front line of the Sino-Indian border, India gradually began to have a different perception.” There have been other commentators in China who have opined that “…China has shattered illusion that we would make concessions” or that disengagement “…does not restore situation to what it was before April 2020 but establishes a buffer zone…” This dichotomy would retain perplexity in appreciating Chinese intent.

Two, the concept of LAC was envisioned in 1993 Peace and Tranquility Agreement. As it developed, in the Central and Eastern Sector, that is HP, Uttarakhand, Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh borders with Tibet, the LAC was based on the Himalayan watershed. In fact, in Arunachal Pradesh, it has the legal sanctity of McMahon Line between the British and Tibet, though China has its own contention. Significantly, China resolved its border issue with Myanmar based upon the very same McMahon Line.

Eastern Ladakh has an incurably flawed concept of LAC. India, on her part, had clearly promulgated patrolling points (PPs) to dominate the border since 1978. The Chinese version of the LAC has remained nebulous and unclear, based upon perceptions created over a period of time. There exists an imprecise Line intimated in 1959/ 1960. An agreed to LAC by both India and China, as conceptualised in the 1993 Agreement, remained on very distant horizon. Even with the new Agreement, this unformulated character of LAC will not change, as the Chinese version will remain indefinable.

Three, the disengagement refers to only two legacy areas of Depsang Bulge and Demchok Nalla (rivulet). The agreements on buffer zones arrived in the last four years, will continue to stand. The forces deployed on both sides of the buffer zones will have to remain and continue to vigil to avoid any breach.

The LAC, despite the Agreement of October 2024, has a changed character. China deliberately showed disdain towards all elaborately prepared CBMs and protocols decided in 1996 and 2005 Agreements. The CBMs have inevitably lost relevance and collapsed in 2020 PLA’s expansionism in Eastern Ladakh. India had to respond with matching force-levels along the entire length of the disputed boundary, leading to a militarised border. Differing buffers (moratoriums on patrolling), which were mutually agreed upon have turned it into a kind of Belt of Actual Control. China’s push for patrolling moratoriums along the LAC in eastern Ladakh obviated the regular fisticuffs and scuffles, although serious tensions remained on the border and politically generally.

Patrolling has apparently commenced, as per news reports to PP 10 in Depsang Plateau by Indian Army, and by PLA to an undisclosed area after negotiating the Bottle neck in Raki Nalla. It is a substantive gain, consistent with our claim of Aksai Chin. Similarly, the extent to which patrolling may ensue in Demchok nalla and in the North East, is as yet unclear, and will have to be studied. In case of patrols of Indian Army and PLA mandate ‘escorts,’ they will require very fine management. Patrolling to many other areas, like the Karakoram Pass/ Samar Lungpa/ Chumar in Eastern Ladakh, Shipkila in HP, Barahoti in Uttrakhand, Rakula in Sikkim and Fishtails in Arunachal Pradesh, will also mandate similar coordination.

Whether the commencement of patrolling in some areas, even with escorts, leads to peace and tranquillity, and stabilises the border is a moot question. These cannot be undertaken under the past CBMs, in an environment of mistrust that will be prone to breakdown. Having been deceived in 2020, Indian Army should tread with caution and vigilance and without the mandatory trust. The PLA forces de-induction to their pre-2020 garrisons remain a far cry, with the state-of-the-art infrastructure including habitat created in South Xinjiang and Tibet. Accordingly, de-escalation ought not be contemplated despite the continual stretch being faced by the Indian Armed Forces.

It is apparent that much has changed, yet much has not. There is progress on the two legacy issues in Eastern Ladakh – Depsang and Demchok. Buffer zones do provide significant comfort levels and disallow physical contestation, yet do not allow relent in vigil. Recommenced patrolling envisages domination on a portion of Depsang plateau and Demchok Nalla, though if the patrols are ‘escorted’ with the level of distrust, the situation may remain tense and edgy. These developments are very noteworthy, but they must not be over-read as effective arrangements for a lasting peace, more as a operational thaw. Again, Armed forces exercising, even routinely, in the proximity of the border will make the situation over-sensitive. Even politically, there was a stark difference in Indian formulation of “contribute to a multipolar Asia and a multipolar world,” while the Chinese statement only mentioned the desire for a multipolar world. Obviously, China does not desire a multipolar Asia!

Four, the larger boundary question with China remains unresolved, historically being left to future generations, open-endedly. Chinese occasional ratchets up extraneous tensions, like 62 renames of places, stapled visas or regular protests on visits of Indian politicians to Arunachal Pradesh. Pragmatically, however, China should well perceive that Arunachal Pradesh is India, and will always remain Indian. It cannot, in any which way, plan differently, despite the comprehensive national power differential. Inevitably, the border has to be brought up in agenda for discussion, the very large demography of India and China, and our civilisational heritage deserves it. Strategic patience cannot be forever!

In sum, will this stretched situation that has persisted over many, many decades destined to remain so indefinitely? Mechanisms for political dialogue are being rejuvenated. The SRs on India-China boundary question will meet at an early date “…to explore a fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable solution to the boundary question.” Though clear demarcation of LAC presently seems so unrealistic, in a graduated manner India and China ought to proceed to examine the LAC and the border.

The recent breakthrough is very encouraging and should inevitably extend to economy and trade. It is apparent that LAC tensions have to be basketed absolutely differently to economic and trade considerations. Even while reengaging China in dialogues, invariably, peace will be guaranteed by the Indian Armed Forces continuing strengthen their resilience and deterrence.