Rising Chinese Air Power in the Maritime Domain – Is it Time to Reset Maritime Strategy?

As the world’s focus is riveted to the rapidly spiraling crisis in the Middle East which threatens to escalate with Iran’s retaliatory missile strike following Israel’s extensive air strikes and the ground invasion of southern Lebanon, it will be a mistake to take the eyes off China. The expansion of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has made it the largest Navy in the world in size, as its overall battle force is expected to grow to 395 ships by 2025 and 435 ships by 2030 and has the United States and other affected nations worried. But what has slipped under the radar is the systematic transformation and development of the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) over the first quarter of this century. ‘The PLA Air Force (PLAAF) continues to grow in size and improve in quality. We saw the massive transfer of all land-based fighter aircraft from the PLA Navy (PLAN) to the PLAAF in 2023, along with the transfer of responsibility for mainland air defense (which had previously been divided between the PLAN and the PLAAF).

The impact of the PLAAF’s expanded role as a coercive military tool is reflected in the significant increase in air violations of Taiwan’s ADIZ, soaring by 79 percent in 2022 compared to 2021. In 2023, Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense reported detecting a total of 4,679 Chinese aircraft in proximity to its airspace, with 1,674 intruding into its ADIZ. Presently, routine violations typically involve one to five aircraft, while assertive violations typically entail six to nine aircraft. Reactionary violations, involving 10 or more aircraft and often linked to geopolitical developments, political signaling, or displays of force, accounted for over 20 percent of violations in 2022. Recent missions in the region have witnessed a surge in numbers, duration, and complexity, often featuring J-10, J-16, and J-20 fighters, H-6 strategic bombers, KJ-500 airborne early warning and command aircraft, and Y-20 U tanker aircraft. “The proliferation of routine violations and assertive air operations by the PLAAF has effectively nullified the unofficial Taiwan Strait centerline, a previously respected boundary intended to mitigate unintended tensions and apply pressure on the island’s inhabitants”. This strategy by Beijing aims to establish “new normal,” wherein routine violations over land, sea, and in the air are escalated to a level where they are perceived as commonplace, deliberately reshaping the status quo in boundary matters.

China’s efforts to enhance its regional dominance extend beyond the maritime domain to encompass air, cyber, space, electromagnetic, subsurface, and emerging security domains such as the deep sea, quantum computing, artificial intelligence, and biological security. While developments in these new security domains are ongoing, the expansion of the PLA’s land-based air power capability strategically complements the PLAN’s growing carrier capabilities. China has expanded its presence and infrastructure across at least seven reefs and artificial islands in the Spratly Islands, including Subi Reef, Mischief Reef, Johnson Reef, Hughes Reef, Gaven Reef, Fiery Cross Reef, and Cuarteron Reef. Notably, Subi, Fiery Cross, and Mischief Reefs now feature airfields capable of supporting fighter operations, enabling the deployment of a variety of aircraft such as fighters, bombers, maritime reconnaissance aircraft, airborne early warning and control (AEWC) aircraft, tanker aircraft, and advanced surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems. This enhances the PLAAF’s ability to project power over both air and maritime spaces in the SCS and beyond, facilitating broader control of the airspace. The PLAAF’s long-range missions by H-6 bombers armed with air-launched cruise missiles to Guam in the second island chain has led to the US withdrawing its continuous bomber deployment in the region for 16 years from the Island to its mainland. China has leveraged its air power not only to bolster the anti-area-access-denial strategy, but it has also arguably deterred the US by seeking to dominate the airspace over the East and South China Seas.

From a perspective of cooperative defence and regional security among Southeast Asian countries, nations such as Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam possess relatively small air forces characterized by a mix of aging and limited modern combat assets. In contrast, Singapore and Taiwan boast modern air force inventories. Individually, none of these nations can rival the capabilities of the PLAAF, yet all are modernizing their air forces recognizing them as the sole viable conventional hard-power option which can bolster their limited maritime capabilities. However, collectively these air forces represent an asymmetric instrument for asserting sovereignty against a dominant China in the nine-dash-line region, expanding the range of response options to counter its increasing capabilities. India, the United States, and Australia are already engaged in various bilateral and multilateral air exercises with many of these nations, offering opportunities for further collaboration. It raises questions about why this aerial dimension has been overlooked in maritime strategy. The oversight of incorporating land-based air power into the naval security discourse has, to a degree, been a casualty of various factors.

First, domain-centric exclusivity has led the services to vie for exclusive ownership of domains, overshadowing the potential integration of air power. Next, historically navies have relied on carrier-based air power in the maritime domain and tended to overlook integrating land-based air power that is not under direct control in their operational matrix. Finally, the erstwhile limitations of air power, including deficiencies in aerial refueling and long-range capabilities of combat platforms, hindered its employment. The last significant exclusively maritime warfare involving airpower occurred during World War II. These factors collectively contributed to the oversight of recognising and leveraging the role of land-based airpower in the larger maritime security construct.

The recent consolidation of People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) aviation assets, encompassing fighters, bombers, air defense, and air surveillance radars, under the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) signifies a strategic shift to streamline defensive operations and synchronise all air-based maritime strike capabilities. This move underscores the pivotal role of land-based air power in China’s present and future regional strategies. Furthermore, it acknowledges the critical importance of air power in controlling the aerial domain within a joint multi-domain approach, emphasising the need to strengthen service-specific core competencies without redundancy. The expanding influence of the PLAAF, reinforced by the People’s Liberation Army Strategic Support Force (PLASSF), across the Indo-Pacific and Indian Ocean Region (IOR), will soon be complemented operationally by the growing carrier capabilities of the PLAN. Integrating land-based air power into the security architecture of the Indo-Pacific and IOR holds significant promise for enhancing regional security dynamics, particularly in light of China’s comprehensive multi-domain strategy. Neglecting this aspect would be a strategic oversight. Addressing the challenge posed by the long-range capabilities of land-based air power can be effectively managed through enhanced cooperative interoperability and shared use of assets and bases among partners, by developing and leveraging access to air bases in the IOR.

Traditionally, regional maritime exercises in the IOR in the past primarily involved bilateral engagements between navies, with limited involvement of carrier-based air assets and integral ship-borne airpower elements, with regional Air Forces carrying out their air exercises independently. Transitioning toward a more integrated approach that combines the strengths of land-based airpower with aerial refueling and forward-staging capabilities is essential for enhancing regional security. Likewise, the collaborative efforts of regional stakeholders to counteract potential threats in space and cyber domains present significant opportunities. Adopting an inclusive, all-domain approach involving the Quad and other multi-lateral engagements is essential for promoting stability and security. This approach aligns with the principles of equal access enshrined in international law, emphasizing the importance of freedom of navigation, unimpeded commerce, and peaceful dispute resolution in common spaces across sea and air domains. Expanding beyond existing bilateral and multilateral maritime and air exercises, towards joint multinational exercises that capitalize on the diverse military capabilities of all participants are crucial for enhancing security in the Indo-Pacific and IOR. In 2018, India’s Prime Minister laid the foundation for an inclusive multi-domain approach: “We will work with others to keep our seas, space, and airways free and open; our nations secure from terrorism; and our cyber space free from disruption and conflict.” This belief creates an opportunity to develop a novel cooperative regional security framework involving all regional stakeholders and those with vested in regional security. India’s shared vision aims to foster an Indian Ocean and an Indo-Pacific which are open, stable, secure, and prosperous for all.

As the world’s most populous democracy and the second-largest nation in Asia, India’s economic and rising power trajectory inevitably positions it to compete or contend with China’s Zhōngguó dream. The legacy of unresolved border issues and past wars with China and Pakistan, who share a strategic friendship and pose threats to India’s rise, create an uncertain geopolitical future. Beijing’s ambitions and Islamabad’s economic and political instability leave India trapped between continental security threats and maritime strategic interests. While these two realms were mutually exclusive in the past, with China’s expanding territorial goals and sea power, India must now balance the sovereignty of its land borders with the freedom of seas simultaneously. Given the increasing blurring of boundaries between land, sea, air, space, and cyber domains, along with their growing interconnectivity and interdependence, the domain-centric approach of the past will limit future strategic outlooks and options. Effectively countering China’s comprehensive security and strategic approach requires all stakeholders to leverage their core competencies and domain strengths to adopt a comprehensive and integrated approach across multiple domains and contested spaces. It is time for a strategy rest.

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Narendra Modi, ‘Prime Minister’s Keynote Address at Shangri La Dialogue June 01, 2018’ (speech, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 1 June 2018), https://www.mea.gov.in/.
Modi, ibid.