ABOUT TIME INDIAN SECURITY FORCES EMPLOYED FORCE MULTIPLIERS IN COUNTER TERRORIST OPERATIONS

While complimenting Northern Command and 16 Corps of the Indian Army for the splendid operations conducted in the Sundarbani-Akhnoor tract on October 28-29, 2024, I need to focus attention on an issue which has been seldom debated but has been hanging around the neck of the Indian Army like a millstone for many years.

Some may have noticed the print media reports and bits of television reporting that the Army’s Infantry Combat Vehicles (ICVs), specifically BMP-2s, which were incidentally present in the area of the recent Akhnoor operations, were involved in the conduct of the highly successful operation with no losses on our side. The acme of success in counter terrorism (CT) operations is always a zero loss on your side which in recent months had gone fairly awry. This very often happens when the strength of terrorists reduces and your own efforts redouble – a strange phenomenon, no doubt. However, that is not the issue I am harping on here. I am first drawing attention to the principle of employment of ICVs in ensuring rapid movement, protection, illumination and shock effect; all of these are ingredients of the package that any weapon system should deliver. It’s a weapon of war for conventional warfighting but I am referring to its potential employment in CT operations.

The problem is not its usage but the lack of it and for unknown reasons; the successful operation in Akhnoor notwithstanding. Let me explain my observation and argue my point. Heavy calibre weapons, gunships, ICVs or tanks and such are all force multipliers, their usage enhances the terminal effect of what a force can deliver. However, usually when fighting insurgency (counter insurgency operations) organised forces refrain from their usage as they have heavy caliber weapons whose use is often considered sacrilege.

Visiting Dubai is always such a pleasure. Its glitzy malls and the Burj are great fun. However, while I am there, one of my favourite pastimes is to ride with Pakistani cab drivers in their cabs. By chance I mostly hit upon the ones from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. I don’t have to speak much, they do the talking and tell me much about how the Pakistan Army has used tanks, ICVs and helicopter gunships to decimate their homes and villages. The Indian Army has never used anything but small arms in J&K or the Northeast. The CAPFs too have always worked with small arms. Should we then have a change of heart now and selectively bring force multipliers into the domain. My argument says a big ‘No’ against insurgents, but a bigger Yes against terrorists or those who have no remorse about civilian targets.

To be fair, it would be good to review the past. Op Pawan, the out of area operations of the Indian Peacekeeping Force (IPKF) in Sri Lanka (Jul 87 – Mar 90) had an intense phase of conventional operations and a peace enforcement phase thereafter. In the former we employed tanks, ICVs, heavy weapons, artillery and helicopters for effect. Despite this we suffered heavy casualties while capturing Jaffna. Thereafter, it was a phase which was a mix of counter terrorism, jungle warfare and peace enforcement, all rolled in one. The IPKF was correct in its ethical and moral code of conduct in the manner in which it treated the civilian population.

However, when it came to the Wani jungles and various coastal areas it very efficiently and surgically employed Ranjit helicopters which were essentially single engine helicopters (Cheetah) mounted with a Medium Machine Gun (belted ammunition) in manual firing mode on either side. The LTTE feared this like anything and this mode of fire assisted in a virtual top attack on hideouts. We also had the IAF’s Mi-25 attack helicopters employed against the Wani camp of the LTTE in Vavuniya along with a few salvos of 120 mm mortars from time to time. My unit never hesitated employing 81 mm mortars in jungle search and destroy operations. The LTTE was organised like a conventional force and contacts were many times much larger than anticipated; the weapons we employed were hugely helpful. Mi-17 helicopters were often used for transportation to reinforce troops or surprise the terrorists.

But the most important aspect of the above employment of force multipliers was the fact that the Army never targeted civilians or directed such fire towards villages or towns. Everything was well away from populated areas with commanders up the chain using their discretion in taking decisions. There were times in Kashmir during days of high intensity operations when I was tempted to employ Ranjit or Mi 25 helicopters against terrorist hideouts in the rocky lairs at the Shamshabari range whenever approaching them to neutralize the holed-up terrorists proved a challenge. I, however, held back considering the norms that were being followed by the Army as a convention. I may have been able to speed up search and destroy operations in the Rajwar Forest if some mortars had been fired into known locations of hideouts. Yet, we stuck to our guns of following the norms of engagement which we had set for ourselves. No regrets on that.

Where I felt a little more strongly was when we suffered casualties while flushing out and neutralising hidden terrorists in some built up areas. The operation at the EDI building at Pampore in Feb 2016 drew a lot of flak from the public because of unnecessary manual intervention which led to casualties in a building quite distanced from population. The presence of a couple of BMP2s would have achieved the desired effect very optimally with no risk to any innocents. Firing a couple of rockets by Mi-25s into the identified floors of the building would have neutralized the terrorists too and perhaps saved a couple of lives.

In 1999 commenced a phase of so called fedayeen attacks with deception based sneak entry into Army and Police camps. In most cases terrorists holed themselves up in a building inside the camp. Neutralizing them took some hours with the loss of a few lives of our officers and jawans. The availability of BMPs may have assisted some of these neutralization efforts, with relative safety. Measured use of BMP fire would have allowed our men to approach the buildings without being exposed.

In 2007 Army convoys suddenly started getting ambushed on the plain roads of the Valley. Had BMP-2s been available the protection element of each convoy, and many of the ROP response elements, could have been equipped with these, with just a little risk of hyper-reactions.

The perception I project here is based upon experience, some regret and lots of visualization of what the future scenario in J&K could be. We are unlikely to completely wipe out terror; shades of it will persist because our chief adversary still executes a dynamic strategy of war by a thousand cuts. It involves high and low periods of activity, focus on key areas and diversion to others, changing nature of targets and objectives, with everything being done with an immense sense of patience – ‘wait it out and the opportunities will flow’, seems to be philosophy. We will therefore continue to witness highs and lows of terrorism and its effects. As we try harder to neutralize the last terrorist, we will make many more mistakes and suffer casualties which will bear somewhat unacceptable ratios. To put a stop to this we need to induct force multipliers so that vulnerability is reduced at every level, chances of terrorist kills enhanced and psychologically the terrorist cadres realize we mean business. Principally we need to change our strategy and our style of conducting operations to tailor our needs.

Is this enough to initiate a debate? There are no right and wrong answers here. If we accept the need, we will require a cadre of commanders who are steeped in the tradition of calibration and the need for caution to avoid collateral because that is something that will not be acceptable – maybe in any other army it would but not in your and my Indian Army. It’s for the Indian Army to realise that lower strength of terrorists many times results in higher ratio of casualties. If this passes muster from the ethical angle, then some experimental aspects must be tried out. Road securing with BMPs, response by armed helicopters against large hideouts, employment of weaponised drones and more will be the order of the day. We will need to prepare the media to view this positively, as much as the rest of the local population. Diplomatically, we would need to be extremely proactive to forestall observations by some interested parties who target India.

If saving soldiers’ lives is the mission then many more measures can be undertaken, for example bullet proof vehicles which may be used for all movement with a time penalty due to the weight of the vehicles.

This is a subject for mature political debate and for adequately messaging Pakistan and all terror groups that India will not hesitate to use force multipliers in the pursuit of its interest, if necessary.