RESETTING DETERRENCE – ISRAELI AIR STRIKE ON IRAN

Amidst narratives of the ongoing conflicts in Europe and the Middle East, increasing employment of missiles and drones have captured the imagination of the military and the civil domains alike, consigning the future of air power to somewhat over-simplistically to bots and swarms. Interestingly, in almost all the current conflicts, conventional or irregular, it is air power which has seen the maximum technology driven exploitation. From extensive use of rockets and missiles to the wide variety of drone usage, from hypersonic weaponry to offensive employment of fighters and bombers, the employment options of the vertical dimension have expanded. While some quarters are making a case for the redundancy of manned air power, Israel continues to leverage its Air Force as the primary instrument of deterrence and punitive strategy.

Since the Arab Israeli Wars of the seventies, through the Intifadas and the current conflict, Israel’s geography has dictated its national security imperatives. The offensive and aggressive use of air power has uniquely allowed this tiny nation to consistently punch above its weight in the region. Its ability to swiftly strike deep inside the enemy’s territory compensates its absence of any strategic depth, and the extensive exploitation of air power across the sub-conventional to the conventional realms has enabled its wide range of offensive employment, both as a militarily and politically. A sanction constrained Iran on the other hand has an ageing Air Force with Cold War era heavyweights like the F-4 Phantom, the F-14 Tomcat, Russian Su 22 & 24s and Mig 29s, ridden with poor serviceability. It has placed orders for the Su 35s from Russia in an effort to bolster its practically non-existent combat air power. Presently, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Aerospace Force develops and operates Iran’s inventory of ballistic missiles, is responsible for air defense in tandem with Iran’s regular military and also serves as the primary operator of Iran’s fleet of unmanned aerial vehicles.

Since its wars with Iraq and the Gulf war, Iran has chosen to focus on building the largest inventory of ballistic missiles consisting of short, medium and multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles, enabling it to dominate the Gulf region and maintaining its ability to deter and retaliate against adversaries, including the United States. Its air defence consisted of a wide mix of anti-aircraft guns and missiles including the Russian supplied S-300PMU-2 air defence systems.[1] Iran’s almost total reliance on ground-based air defence systems has been primarily due to the lack of modern fighter aircraft. It ground based radar holdings provides layered coverage of approximately sixty percent of the country, focused mainly on protecting Tehran, Persian Gulf naval bases, and Iran’s nuclear development sites. Ironically, Iran’s Aerospace Force and its deterrence strategy depends on exactly the future military inventory profile being prescribed by a certain section of the strategic community, especially in India – a rocket and missile force, a large drone force, reliance on a defensive ‘air denial’ strategy with proliferation of air defence systems, and the reduction of reliance on conventional manned combat platforms. Will it serve India’s waning conventional deterrence?

The attack on the Iranian Consulate in Damascus on April 01, 2024, which killed seven IRGC members, led to the mass aerial strike of 330 missiles and drones against Israel from Iran, flying over Syria, Jordan, and Iraq. The strike did not include any manned combat aircraft, and comprised of 120 ballistic missiles, 170 drones and 30 cruise missiles, of which Israel claimed 90 percent were intercepted.[2] Once again, the killings of Hamas, Hezbollah and IRGC leadership elicited the first October attack when Iran launched between 180 and 200 missiles targeting Israel once again. Interestingly, two of the major targets were Israeli Air Force bases of Nevatim and Tel Nof, which received over twenty hits and three hits respectively as per satellite imagery. Missiles and drones are the only long-range strike capability that Iran possesses given that its legacy combat aircraft have not been used in operations in a long time. Whether it is forty or twenty-three hits which Nevatim took, the fact is despite Israel having the best multi-tiered Air Defence system, missiles got through. However, given the limited damage which was nowhere near enough to stop follow-on air operations from these air bases, the question of efficacy of mass missile attacks against key targets comes up.

Israel’s retaliation was well planned, measured and deliberately executed to display its national resolve by way of its offensive air power capability, both to punish for the two aerial strikes and to deter future ones. The Israeli Air Force retaliated on October 26 at 1:50 AM, with over 100 fighter jets, mission support and intelligence aircraft, and flight refuellers participating to strike twenty target locations more than 1,600 km away. The largest conventional military attack on Iran since 1980, was conducted in three waves, where the first wave focused on Iran’s air defense system, and the second and third waves focused on missile & drone bases and weapons’ productions sites. The classic air strike operation reportedly involved advanced deception tactics, and selective suppression/destruction of Iranian AD that included all four of Iran’s remaining S-300 air defense systems, stationed to protect key nuclear and oil facilities. The targeted sites included defensive installations at the Bandar Imam Khomeini petrochemical complex, its adjacent port, and the Abadan oil refinery, three large missile production bases of Falagh, Shaid Ghadiri and Abdol Fath, defence industrial sites involved in high explosive tests related to nuclear weapon development, and facilities linked to sensitive military projects. Saudi media reported the destruction of around 20 heavy fuel mixers, each worth ~$2 million. Sources within Iran’s missile industry say the site will likely require at least two years to resume operations. Satellite images of the Khojir and Parchin missile production facilities reveal targeted strikes on warehouses and buildings linked to the manufacture of solid-fuel ballistic missiles.[3]

Mass aerial attacks by missile and drones, which have created immense media traction and political rhetoric, have actually created disproportionately much lesser military effects or strategic outcomes. Iran’s security strategy, which was centred on air defence, has not only failed to deter Israeli air strikes, its overhyped strategic offensive capability, solely dependent on missiles and drones, has proven ineffective in creating any worthwhile military or strategic effect. Certainly, there has been escalation restrained targeting by both sides, but the stark difference in targeting accuracy and outcomes of selective weapon-to-target matching of two contrasting air powers are for all to see. ‘Israel’s strikes have exposed Iran’s vulnerabilities, particularly the apparent degradation of its air defence systems. This also underscores the limitations of Tehran’s forward-defence doctrine, which relies on proxies to shield Iran from direct conflict. Given these setbacks, Iran is probably keen to avoid an extended period of direct confrontation with Israel’.[4] Iran’s anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) strategy which sought to prevent an adversary from entering or operating in areas essential to its security and sovereignty,[5] has failed.

The Israeli Air Force has unequivocally proved its depth offensive capability of striking multiple targets deep inside Iran, over a large and dispersed area, with accuracy and a target selection that underscores the enduring ability of air power to attack strategic targets, including nuclear sites if necessary. From a larger security perspective, Iran’s ‘Ring of Fire’ strategy, introduced by the former IRGC-QF commander Qassem Soleimani, has also failed as investing in proxy forces around Israel has not prevented an attack deep in its heartland. The inevitable questions which arise are – Has the sole reliance on a strategic missile and drone force, at the cost of a conventional air force, ill-served Iran’s interests strategically and military? Does Iran possess enough ballistic missiles for a full-fledged war against Israel given that production has been disrupted? Has the destruction of Iran’s AD systems left the country vulnerable to repeat air strikes by Israel? With the likelihood of a total deterrence failure should Israel choose to attack not only military but energy and nuclear targets in the future, the decision to escalate to a larger conflict lies with the Iranian leadership which has vowed revenge.

India’s two-adversary-multi-front threat from China and Pakistan, includes two strong air forces. Offensive air power therefore remains a critical constituent of India’s conventional deterrence capability and is the only credible depth targeting option in the nation’s military strategy and conventional response matrix. The stark lessons of the Middle East highlight the role of air power in a nation’s security strategy and a resilient deterrence capability. New Delhi should pay serious attention.

[1] https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/iran-russian-air-defence-strengths-limitations

[2] https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-10113/CBP-10113.pdf

[3] https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/operation-days-repentance-impact-israels-strikes-iran

[4] Ibid

[5] Iran Military Power Ensuring Regime Survival and Securing Regional Dominance, Defence Intelligence Agency Report, 2019, https://www.dia.mil/portals/110/images/news/military_powers_publications/iran_military_power_lr.pdf