FIRST-PERSON VIEW DRONES: LETHAL ASSETS IN MODERN WARFARE

As the world continues with unabated fervour in describing the exploits of ‘First-Person View’ (FPV) Drones (FPVD) in the Russia-Ukraine War and the Israel-Hamas/Hezbollah standoff, it may not be out of place to state that FPVD have been participants in combat since the beginning of the 20^th century!

When World War-II broke out, Lt. Commander Delmar Farhney, a United States Navy Engineering Officer, was tasked to produce an assault drone mounted with a miniaturized television camera/transmitter for capturing/transmitting live feedback to the drone operator. By 1942, this led to the creation of three Special Task Air Groups (STAGs) to deploy drones in the Pacific Theater. These twin-engine drones, designated as TDR-1, mounted a camera in their nose and transmitted images back to a screen in the cockpit of a TBM Avenger torpedo bomber. The drone itself was controlled via remote-control by the pilot of the Avenger.

On 27 September 1944, four TDR1 drones, each armed with a 2,000-pound bomb, flew into the Solomon Islands to attack a Japanese anti-aircraft battery deployed on a beached merchant ship. While most of the drones failed to hit, one flew through anti-aircraft fire to land dead-centre on target and exploded. In spite of marginal success, this action marked the advent of the FPVD in operations!

The TDR FPVD in Operations in the Pacific in World War-II: Source-forbes.com

While the ambit of FPVD now extends into all three domains of land, sea and air, this article will restrict itself to the description of aerial FPV drones, based on their overwhelming usage in modern combat.

How is an FPVD Defined?

The FPVD, one of the most defining weapon platforms of the Russo-Ukraine War, is so-called because it is controlled by a ‘first-person view’ function. It is essentially a remote-controlled aircraft equipped with a specialized camera and video transmission system that transmits a live, stabilized video-feed directly to the drone-operator’s goggles or a hand-held/mobile device. This enables the drone-operator to observe the drone’s field-of-view (FOV) in real-time, like a pilot, allowing for intimate battle situation assimilation. Control and execution of the task assigned is effected by the ‘pilot’ via remote-control. This unique ability to control the drone in real-time from a first-person perspective unlocks several options for Reconnaissance, Intelligence, Surveillance and Target Acquisition (RISTA) missions and kinetic strikes.

Ukrainian Soldier with an FPVD System: Source-mil.in.ua

Advantages of/ Challenges to FPVD.

          Several advantages accrue from FPVD usage, which also need to surmount certain challenges. Some of these are elucidated below.

• Higher Speeds and Improved Performance. These attributes constitute one of the most significant advantages of FPVD over larger Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV). Lower weights result in increased speeds for the same propulsive effort and offer greater responsiveness to control- substantial advantages in contested environments and when navigating uncongenial terrain/battlespaces. These in turn enhance survivability and reduce turnaround times.

• Affordability and Application. The affordable price-tag is a major benefit of FPVD. Drones with high-performance characteristics cost just a fraction of the price of a military-grade UAV. An FPVD worth approximately USD 1000 can carry an onboard munition capable of incapacitating/destroying an Armoured Fighting Vehicle, weapon-emplacement or other adversary targets costing many times more. Low prices also allow quick proliferation, increasing mission-redundancy, presenting wider deployment options and ensuring greater operator-survivability. FPVD can execute stand-off precision attacks at a fraction of the cost of conventional precision-munitions, with minimal training.

• Extended Range and Longevity. FPVD can cover vast areas for real-time RISTA missions, kinetic-strike, and Search & Rescue tasks. Most modern FPVD are equipped with advanced power-management systems, allowing battery preservation for extended flight-times/time-on-station, thus increasing operational efficiency and assuring greater mission success.

• Stealth and Manoeuverability. Owing to compactness and high-manoeuverability, FPVD  can access hard-to-reach and risk-prone areas virtually unnoticed, gathering crucial RISTA information/carrying out precision-strikes without significant risk to operators/with minimal collateral damage.

• Enhanced Safety. FPVD designers tend to incorporate additional safety layers that increase redundancy and prolong operational life. These could include duplicate flight controllers/receivers/motors, ensuring that the drone will remain stable and controllable even if one component fails. Most modern FPVD incorporate built-in GPS, automatic stabilization and advanced sensors that help prevent flight accidents and reduce risk of damage, whether from loss of control or attempted adversary action.

• Challenges.

• Despite the above, FPVD face the inevitable requirement of constant technical upgradation to stay ahead of an adversary’s electronic warfare (EW) capabilities, which constitute a significant threat to reliability/survivability in combat. The efficacy of FPVD is also generally limited by battery life (typically 10-30 minutes per flight). Proliferation of counter-drone technologies, whether in the electronic or kinetic domain, require FPVD to outmanoeuver/survive these challenges, without the advantage of significant standoff capability. Apropos, constant evolution in drone-technology, including EW hardening to reduce permeability, physical hardening against kinetic threats, greater responsiveness/manoeuverability of machines and training of operators are imperative for mission-success. A case in point is the recent development of a low-cost drone by the University of South Australia, which combines celestial navigation with passive vision-based algorithmic flight computing. The guidance system is thus impervious to jamming. Similar invulnerability to jamming is achieved with fiber-optic guidance, though this restricts range/manoeuverability. FPVD, with their limited avionics, are also vulnerable to kinetic-strikes, wherein they can be targeted by specialized kinetic counter-drone equipment or even by troops on ground attempting to down FPVD with personal weapons, as seen extensively in the Russia-Ukraine War.

While indigenous FPVD technologies around the world, including in India, are gathering momentum, a large percentage of FPVD components are sourced from China, making supply chains sensitive to geopolitical tensions. China’s recent export restrictions have highlighted these vulnerabilities, as militaries worldwide are scrambling to secure alternate sources or ramp up indigenous production capabilities.

Source:droneii.com

FPVD Components

An FPVD system has several key components. The drone itself is usually a small, manoeuverable multi-rotor model with precise control, hovering, and vertical take-off/landing (in case of multi-mission drones). The drone would mount a basic/hi-definition camera (based on the mission-mode) and a high-quality video-transmitter.  This ensures a reliable live video-feed with low latency, or minimal time-lag between the camera’s FOV and what is visible to the operator. At the operator’s end, the system includes an FPV headset with goggles and a remote-controller. The headset mounts a screen that displays the first-person view (camera-feed from the FPVD).

Typical Components of a FPVD:Source-fpvfilming.com

Note:- Specialised payloads including RISTA equipment/explosive ordnance may be strapped/fitted below the FPVD.

FPVD Applications in Modern Combat

While early FPVD were essentially camera-mounted, fixed-wing UAVs, today’s FPVD are highly manoeuverable rotary/fixed-wing crafts with variable mission-oriented payloads. These could include RISTA payloads, high-explosive ordnance, anti-tank guided-missiles, thermobaric thermite/napalm dispensers, anti-personnel/scatter mines, seismic-pulse generators to trigger mines, shrapnel ammunition and ‘piggyback’ drones. The battlefields in Ngorno-Karabakh, Russia-Ukraine, and more recently, in the Levant, have all seen a proliferation of such FPVD, used to telling effect.

Russia-Ukraine War (RUW).  Protracted periods of attrition-style warfare with grinding gains saw the advent of easily procurable, small and manoeuverable FPVD for RISTA/one-way, kamikaze-style attacks in the RUW.  Ukraine provided the first hints of weaponized COTS drone-technologies when makeshift camera-mounted drones were used to drop grenades. These FPVD, now used for RISTA/kinetic-kill, have significantly hampered survivability of ground troops, resulting in a paradigm shift in battle-procedures. Apropos, the use of COTS FPVD has escalated rapidly.

A Soldier of 501st Separate Marine Infantry Battalion (Ukraine Marine Corps) Launching an FPVD with Explosive Ordnance: Source-insideunmannedsystems.com

As per sources, the Ukrainian Defence Ministry supplied 1.2 million UAVs to their Defence Forces in 2024, with another 100,000 being added shortly. A significant percentage of these numbers is made up by FPVD.  Russia, initially lagging behind in use of FPVD, ramped up production in the latter-half of 2023 and now deploys at-par numbers of these crafts. Russian audio intercepts reveal that the tactics adopted in the face of FPVD attacks is to ‘scatter’, dispersing manpower/equipment to reduce vulnerability. Drone-strikes therefore significantly disrupt the functioning of ground-forces, causing considerable wastage of effort/time spent in mitigating losses. Russia, in response to Ukrainian FPVD strikes, has deployed military-grade EW systems and also police drone-tracking equipment- the latter providing accurate launch-site coordinates for targeting by Russian artillery. Russia also started extensively deploying their own versions of FPVD, resulting in Ukraine’s increasing commitment in weathering Russian drone attacks-numbering more than 7000 since early 2024! Marking a milestone in focused military-grade FPVD development, Ukraine has recently developed the 15-inch Queen Hornet FPVD-intended to fill the gap between small kamikaze drones and the heavy, hexacopter Vampire bomber-drones. It is stated to be effective against entrenched positions, for remote minelaying, communications relay and as an FPVD carrier-the latter to increase the strike-range of smaller, ‘piggyback’ FPVD. Such ‘piggyback’ drones were recently used to destroy a Russian ‘Pantsir’ Air Defence System in Southern Ukraine. Ukraine has also been reported to be using FPVD for deploying Improvised Explosive Devices. Both sides are also experimenting with deployment of RISTA/strike FPVD in tandem, the former used to direct attacks by the latter. Another recent feature of the RUW is use of FPVD to destroy larger fixed-wing UAVs/manned helicopters. Ukrainian kamikaze FPVD downed a Russian Mi-8 Helicopter in July  2024, followed by interception of a Mi-28 Attack Helicopter a month later. A Russian Lancet Loitering Munition was also reportedly downed by a Ukrainian FPV kamikaze drone in September last year. Russia, which responded by equipping their UAVs with AI algorithms for FPVD-avoidance, is also equipping FPVD with incendiary payloads for drone-on-drone attacks. As a further adaptation, use of FPVD-swarm attacks, combining RISTA and FPV kamikaze drones with artillery fire support, have also achieved significant success in the RUW.

Israel-Hamas/Hezbollah Conflict.  Israel has been using FPVD for several years, in part to neutralize flammable balloons that Palestinians floated into the Western Negev from the Gaza Strip. Since then, Israel has made significant strides in FPVD, leveraging knowledge of their use in the RUW, and developing cutting-edge technologies that enhance FPVD RISTA/offensive capabilities. Meanwhile, Hamas (and to a lesser extent Hezbollah) have realised and are taking advantage of the asymmetric advantages that accrue from FPVD. FPVD use by the Israeli Defence Force (IDF)  is more common in the Northern Front against Hezbollah than in operations in the Gaza Strip against Hamas. This is partly due to existing IDF air superiority there, with fighter aircraft being able to launch high-explosive ordnance with impunity to cause significant damage, rather than solely rely on small FPVD. In Gaza especially, the radio-frequency clutter is so extensive due to jamming and GPS-spoofing transmissions that COTS FPVD signals are overwhelmed, making it difficult to deploy/manoeuvre them. The use of drones by Hezbollah, seen in Hamas’s October 2023 attack on Israel, appeared to be essentially dependent on GPS. They are also increasingly employing kamikaze-type FPVD with a range of 10-20 Km. Techniques for pinpointing/eliminating adversary drone operators have become a major focus, and all sides are investing heavily in sophisticated detection equipment/tactics. The IDF has been employing the SMASH (Smart-Shooter) targeting system, mounted on personal weapons of ground troops, that allows its forces to identify and kinetically intercept such drones. Nevertheless, in both sectors, the limiting factor for successful FPVD deployment has been the standard of training of operators and not so much the availability of FPVD for deployment.

Syrian Conflict. The use of armed  FPVD is not new in Syria, which saw their first widespread use by ISIS  and other jihadist organisations. What began as the modification of  COTS FPVD to drop grenades/improvised explosives, has expanded significantly. Since the beginning of 2024, Russian operatives were reported to be exporting complete FPVD kits and maintenance backup to Syria. This allowed the Syrian Arab Army to resort to large-scale use of FPVD in the Syrian Civil War. Conversely, the offensive by Syrian rebels to overthrow the Assad regime saw the use of short-range kamikaze FPVD among other larger UAVs, used to  accurately strike tanks, artillery gun-positions, and troops. These FPVD were similar to models being used in Ukraine and other conflicts. A recent report suggested that Ukrainian drone operators and a significant number of FPVD were deployed in Syria to assist the rebels. Recently, Syrian rebels launched a fresh assault on Aleppo, adding impetus to a relatively frozen conflict. Initial footage and reports suggest that FPVD played a prominent role in the offensive. Syrian rebel forces appear to have used kamikaze FPVD to attack Syrian Army troops in a bid to soften adversary targets and to support their attacking forces. Reports indicate that rebel forces have task-organised their UAS and FPVD forces into Al-Shaheed (Falcon) Brigades. These FPVD are predominantly used for two types of missions- (a) For reduction of static/entrenched positions and (b) For hunter-killer dynamic targeting. FPVD have also been used for battle-damage assessment, to plan subsequent strikes. The drones being used in Syria are the result of years of planning/preparation by rebel forces, with drone production undertaken in small factories and safehouses from as early as 2019, using Chinese parts and 3D-printed components.

The Future

FPVD usage in military operations is likely to influence the balance in asymmetrical warfare, with inferior militaries being able to inflict casualties/shape operations against larger, more militarily capable forces.

While a large percentage of today’s FPVD used for kinetic-strikes are one-way, kamikaze craft, Nations and non-State actors are devising new technology, including improvements in autonomous-flight, energy-efficiency, and payload capacity, making them more resilient, capable and reusable in battlefield conditions.  Ukrainian non-profit groups have pioneered reusable dive-bombing drones which release small munitions and can execute multiple missions. FPVD are also being integrated with AI/machine learning, with improvement in autonomous and ‘return-home’ capabilities, thus increasing survivability and consequently lowering mission/training costs. Self-guided FPVD are also evolving, which only require an initial screen lock-on to chart out a flight-path to the target.

Due to the proliferation and efficacy of FPVD, future conflicts are bound to see a significant effort diverted toward counter-drone measures. A shift towards more dispersed deployments is likely to become the norm, to minimize casualties. Such deployments would become an operational imperative in future conflicts.

RISTA-kinetic attack FPVD teaming is likely to become a norm to increase ‘kill-efficacy’ of these systems, especially in ‘hunter-killer’ operations.

FPVD-operator training is likely to be formally incorporated in most militaries. Ukraine’s drone warfare unit is set to expand into a formal brigade, marking an unprecedented transformation in operational capacity. Russia has also announced plans to consolidate drone operations under a separate branch in its Ministry of Defence. While China has not officially designated a separate ‘drone corps’, the extensive integration of UAVs across its military branches underscores the strategic importance Beijing places on  such technology.

FPVD guidance is likely to incorporate newer, disruptive technologies including GPS-free celestial/terrestrial guidance, hopping frequencies and fiber-optics links to obviate the effects of adversary’s EW. In this light, development of indigenous FPVD technologies for military use is imperative, to offset tenuous supply of ex-import components.

As a recognition of the utility of FPVD in operations, the Indian Army (IA) has begun integrating FPVD with the T-90 Main Battle Tank, to provide tank crews with real-time surveillance capabilities for situational awareness and enhanced battlefield survivability. An Indian firm, DroneAcharya Aerial Innovations supplied FPVD to the IA in April last year, which have since successfully completed trials in high-altitude terrain.

Deployment of FPVD swarms would increase the ‘kill-potential’ of such systems manifold and could effectively saturate a battlefield in favour of the deployer. Future battlefields will see swarm technology being applied to FPVD operations and would necessitate urgent development/incorporation of countermeasures to assure survivability. Massed deployment of ground forces are likely to be significantly restricted by this paradigm. The IA has also operationalised drone-swarms and is exploring more potent fixed-wing solutions. NewSpace Research and Technologies, an Indian company, among others, is developing swarming systems for kinetic/non-kinetic saturation effects in favour of the Indian Defence industry.

As a point of concern, the use of physically controlled/autonomous FPVD in conflicts raises concerns of collateral damage, since physical remoteness of operators/AI can diminish sensitivity. Strict concepts of operations (CONOPS) and ethical boundaries need therefore to be factored into operational philosophies to prevent wanton/excessive destruction being wrought by users of FPVD technology.

Conclusion

The swift transition of FPVD from commercial use to the battlefield highlights their versatility and pivotal role in today’s military conflicts. These machines embody a transition to cost-effective, low-intensity and flexible operational tactics on the battlefield. Apropos, FPVD are poised to become a standard component of military arsenals globally, transforming both drone-technology and its application in military operations.