TERROR ON THE RAILWAY TRACKS: A BALOCH TRIGGER

It was waiting to happen.  A big-ticket event revolving around a high-profile act of terror, is something one could have expected any time after the triggering of turbulence in the international order in 2025.  Terrorists too like to show their place in the world’s pecking order of strategic threats. Where, when exactly and what nature of act would be perpetrated always remains uncertain. In the murky and gory world of hard-core terrorism, terrorists are always on the lookout to conduct an earth-shaking event which remains work in progress. The terror act of Oct 7, 2023, on the Gaza-Israel border, was executed for a purpose; to reignite the Palestine issue and remind the world that it could not simply move on and let the fate of the Palestinians be relegated to history. Many years ago, on Oct 6, 1973, Anwar Sadat had launched not a terror act but a full-scale war just to achieve an ignition (spark); that was to remind the world that Egypt’s territory was under Israeli occupation and needed to be negotiated if peace was to prevail.  I term these ‘copycat events’ when terrorists, militants or insurgents learn from bygone events to piece together a fresh strategy for their purported cause and objective. 

It is with the above analogy that one should review the complex dynamics of the recent hostage drama in Pakistan, leading off from the hijacking of the train bound from Quetta to Peshawar. A Pakistani intelligence failure is obvious.  Indian intelligence agencies have been good at neutralising and preventing such acts by some sharp synthesis of information converted to intelligence; even though some big terror acts have happened in India’s history of terror.  However, in Pakistan these terror acts continue unabated in spite of the self-promoted label of proficiency assumed by the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). Perhaps this could be due to the very large number of terrorist groups in Pakistan, the per capita rate of radicalization being so very high and the single-handed doctrine of use of only brute force as a dictum of counter terror operations. The parallel track of humanitarian and people’s outreach doesn’t ever get reflected in any effort of the Pakistan security forces.  In addition, Pakistan is well known for its policy of nurturing ‘good terrorists’ and pursuing ‘bad terrorists’. This policy always has unauthorized citizens brandishing arms with state support.

The Baloch are thriving in the environment that Pakistan has created for itself. They are classified terrorists by Pakistan and some other nations but not the United Nations. Theirs is the classic case of using nationalism as a tool towards separatism without resort to radicalization. The Baloch Liberation Army (BLA), very noticeably, did not resort to indiscriminate violence against innocents in the recent incident of the train hijack. In fact, as per many versions of the passengers, they actually ensured that all civilians got down from the train and were shepherded away. Versions and narratives are inevitable after an event of this nature but the credibility of the Pakistan Army and its public relations wing, the ISPR, is rock bottom after a history of indiscriminate employment of disproportionate force, involving multiple military resources and wherewithal against target villages in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. There are enough narratives in circulation of the use of armed helicopters and other aviation resources, artillery, tanks and Infantry Combat Vehicles (ICVs) to punish and evacuate all villages, where the Tehreek e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) was ostensibly entrenched, so that these become incapable to support human existence. Some of the worst human rights violations have occurred in those areas, as explained in detail by those who fled and live in the Middle East to sustain themselves.

Why did the BLA carry out this action? The answer, to some extent, lies in what has already been explained; the propensity of a movement to start fading over a period of time. Sustaining a uniform rate of conduct of operations is constrained by several factors and even though BLA had a fairly active record in the preceding months the sudden return of TTP was garnering most of the eyeballs. Insurgent movements of this kind need to maintain their relevance. One can recall that in 2024 we often assessed that the chain of terror related events in the Jammu division and specifically in the Pir Panjal South, was designed by Pakistan’s ISI to maintain relevance of the investment it had made in the networks in J&K over many years. The BLA’s plight was somewhat similar. It would have looked for something uniquely spectacular, such as the targeting of the Army Public School, Peshawar on Dec 16, 2014, by the TTP which resulted in 149 fatalities including 132 children.  It therefore came up with the idea of the train hijack, a difficult operation but one which would elevate the BLA and the Baloch separatist movement to a higher level on the pedestal of Pakistan’s security concerns. The BLA has the Majeed Brigade, the suicide squad known for carrying out high-profile suicide attacks against Pakistani security forces, state installations, and Chinese interests in the region. The Karachi University attack in 2022 marked a significant shift, as Shari Baloch became the first female suicide bomber deployed by the Majeed Brigade. A series of hits against Chinese personalities fetched it the notoriety it sought. However, none can ever be sure what the response of the Pakistan security forces will be. In 2015 the ongoing Operation Zarb e Azb, received a huge impetus after the Army Public School event, followed by Operation Radd ul Fassad in 2017. The National Action Plan (NAP) was introduced as a 20-point counterterrorism strategy to eliminate extremism. The TTP was targeted along with groups such as Lashkar e Jhangvi, and over a period of time the TTP was banished to Taliban territories in Afghanistan. It returned in full force progressively after 2021 when the Afghan Taliban came to power and is now a proxy of the Afghan Taliban. The BLA has always to calculate that its threshold violent acts achieve the objectives without drawing reprisals which are over the top.  

China would be concerned about the security of CPEC and its personnel and may demand from Pakistan upping the ante in the Baloch areas. Two things could transpire from there. First, a larger deployment of the Pakistan Army and therefore availability of more targets and objectives (for the separatists) which inevitably come about with the presence of security forces. Second, the targeting of civilian areas by the Pakistan security forces, could give an impetus to BLA’s home support and an enhancement of the status of the separatist movement.  

The temptation of most foreign and Pakistani analysts, as also all security agencies and political personalities, is to find a linkage between the group and India. This psychological warfare and propaganda are highly deniable despite multiple allegations. Giving Pakistani personalities space on our mainstream television remains a counterproductive practice.

The Pakistan state policy has nurtured selected terrorist groups as instruments of asymmetric proxy warfare against neighbours while maintaining high levels of denial. Simultaneously it has conducted intense counter terrorist operations against other groups within Pakistan. The former are the West Punjab jihadi groups, Jamat ul Dawa (JuD), Jaishe e Mohammad (JeM), Al Badr etc. while the internal terror groups are the Tehreek e Taliban (Pakistan) (TTP) and the anti-Shia groups, Lashkar e Jhangvi etc.  This policy of breeding snakes in the backyard, has been constantly pointed out to Pakistan’s leadership to no effect.  It’s the Pakistan Army’s instrument of retaining power through the projection of its relevance, both in the context of winning back J&K from India and proving itself as the only instrument to retain and handle Pakistan’s integrity. Even a rookie analyst could tell the Generals, the politicians and the people of Pakistan that nations are built by giving confidence to the people not by perpetrating violence, rights violations and low-grade administration. It’s time for both the Pakistan Army and the Pakistan State to take a long and deep breath and look into the mirror because the world around them is rapidly changing.  Terror as a weapon to counter terror may be the most inappropriate way; some lessons can be learnt from the Indian model of handling militancy and terrorism, quite successfully.

The problems that the Pakistan Army now faces are spread from Bangladesh to Afghanistan. It includes the reported failure of the Pakistan Army to overthrow General Waker-uz-Zaman the Bangladesh Army Chief. Pakistan is seeking an expanded foothold in Bangladesh which was being resisted by General Zaman. The Pakistan Army has to remain alert on the Afghanistan border and in areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. There is the constant threat of Imran Khan’s party, the Tehreek e Insaaf, blockading the national capital and there is a full corps in PoK, along the LoC. If the Pakistan Army is to conduct expanded operations in Baluchistan it will be stretched beyond measure.   There are two conditions that may emerge from this. First, low risk at the LoC with very limited actions in J&K, enough to keep the situation festering; with large-scale intervention in Balochistan. Second option is to activate Kashmir within a threshold and aim for national unity through projection of a serious Indian threat. None of the options is likely to succeed.