RUSSIA’s MISSILES: A KNIFE AT EUROPE’s THROAT!

November 21, 2024, 5:17 AM. An ‘Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile’ (IRBM) fired from Russia hit a major Ukrainian military-industrial site used for manufacturing missiles/ armaments in Dnipro, a town in Eastern Ukraine. The attack triggered explosions that lasted for over three hours. Hours after the strike, Russian President Vladimir Putin stated that Russia had launched a “new conventional intermediate range” missile codenamed Oreshnik, meaning ‘hazel tree’ in Russian. Putin further mentioned that the weapon travelled at a speed of Mach 10 (3.4 Km/second) on its way to the target, adding that “there are currently no ways of counteracting this weapon”. He concluded that the missile strike was ‘successful’. Ukrainian military intelligence postulated that the aforesaid missile, part of a larger missile strike against the Dnipro military complex, was a ‘new type of ICBM’, which travelled at Mach 11 and took 15 minutes to strike its target after having been launched from the Astrakhan Region in Southwest Russia, more than 1000 Km away. They further stated that the missile had six warheads, each with six sub-munitions possessing ground-penetration capabilities. The Pentagon later stated that the said missile was based on the Russian RS-26 (SSX-31) Rubezh IRBM, and that the United States (US) was informed by Russia shortly in advance of its impending launch.

Google-Earth Screenshot Showing Astrakhan and Dnipro: Source-earth.google.com

The above inference of Ukrainian intelligence is corroborated by BBC’s examination of video footage of the missile strike, which showed six flashes, each comprised of a cluster of six individual projectiles. The missile strike was allegedly launched by Russia in retaliation for the use of US’ Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) long-range surface-to-surface missiles and United Kingdom’s/ European Union’s (UK/EU) Storm Shadow (SCALP) air-launched cruise missiles by Ukraine on Russian territory for the first time, thereby ‘escalating tensions in the conflict’.

Timelapse Video-Grab Showing the Oreshnik Missile Impact in Dnipro: Source-uk.news.yahoo.com

The RS-26 is a solid-fuelled, multi-stage, nuclear-capable missile based on the RS-24 Yars road-mobile ICBM, with a maximum range of 5800 Km. This range bracket puts the RS-26 at the cusp of the IRBM and Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) ranges, which would explain the differing nomenclature used by various sources to describe the missile-strike. The IRBM (this term will be used for the Oreshnik hereinafter, for the sake of commonality) is capable of carrying four 150-300 kiloton Thermonuclear Multiple Independently Targeted Re-entry Vehicles (MIRV) or one Avangard Hypersonic Glide Vehicle (HGV) capable of being carried as a nuclear/conventional payload (the Avangard can also be mounted on a SS-19 [Mod] ICBM) (read more about HGVs @ https://chanakyaforum.com/hypersonic-weapons-new-sprint-kings-in-strategic-weapons-race/). The Avangard has a stated maximum speed of Mach 27, akin to a ballistic re-entry vehicle, though its speed in the terminal phase would be much lower, albeit still in the region of Mach 5. These speeds give the Avangard the equivalent of 21 tons of TNT in kinetic energy alone, without considering any conventional explosive/nuclear warhead it may be carrying!

RS-26 Missile:Source-army-today.ru

Typical Flight-Sequence of a Multi-Stage IRBM:Source-en.defence-ua.com

Given the varied profile and groundbreaking technology of ballistic missiles used/ demonstrated by Russia against Ukraine in the last two years, and President Putin’s tweaking of Russia’s Nuclear Doctrine, it would not be far-fetched to postulate that NATO, and more specifically Europe, would remain under shadow of an impending missile strike by Russian missiles, should (in the opinion of President Putin and the Siloviki), the geo-political situation warrant such a misadventure.

Russia’s Missile Arsenal / Vectors Employed Against Ukraine

Russia has employed a wide variety of ballistic and cruise missiles in the war against Ukraine since February 2022. The types of land/sea/air-launched missiles used reflect the diversity and capability of Russia’s missile arsenal. This is contrasted by Russia’s use of the S-300 missiles (essentially developed for ballistic missile defence [BMD]) as surface-to-surface missiles (SSM) for engaging ground targets-an unintended role that necessitated the addition of GPS navigation, modification to the missiles’ warheads for ground-use and alteration of the S-300’s algorithms and radars to track ground targets. This ‘repurposing’ of the S-300 for ground use points towards a likely withering of Russia’s SSM arsenal, possibly as a result of global sanctions and as a direct fallout of the long-drawn war in Ukraine. Be that as it may, the diversity and depth of Russia’s missile arsenal and the adaptations to make existing vectors viable for conventional use/ more lethal, portray a clear danger to Europe and NATO, should the war spill beyond Ukraine’s boundaries.
Appended below are details of Russia’s missile arsenal: –

Russia’s Nuclear Military Assets Held with Strategic and Nonstrategic Forces: Source-thebulletin.org

Note. Russia is also developing a ground-launched, nuclear-armed cruise-missile with global range (as a virtue of being nuclear-powered)-the 9M730 Burevestnik (NATO designation SSC-X-9 Skyfall).

Russia’s Land-based Missiles:Source-missilethreat.csis.org

Russia’s Land-Attack Cruise Missiles:Source-Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat 2020- media.defense.gov

Russia’s Kinzhal Air-Launched Ballistic Missile (ALBM): Source-Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat 2020- media.defense.gov

Note. Russia operates two nuclear-capable heavy bombers: the Tu-160 Blackjack and the Tu-95MS Bear-H. Active inventory estimates are about 67-70 aircraft, with fewer deployed. Both bomber types can carry the nuclear AS-15 air-launched cruise missile (ALCM), with upgraded versions also carrying the new Kh-102 nuclear ALCM.

Russia’s Ship/Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles: Source-Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat 2020- media.defense.gov

Note. Russia boasts up to 16 nuclear-powered, nuclear-armed ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), 11 nuclear-powered cruise missile submarines (SSGNs) and 14 nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs upgraded to carry cruise missiles)-most of them operational. The Russian Navy is also developing a nuclear-powered/nuclear-armed torpedo-Poseidon, scheduled for delivery to the Navy in 2027.

While Russia has restricted employment of missiles against Ukraine to the conventional domain (these include the Oreshnik, the Kh-101 ALCM, the Iskander-M Short-Range Ballistic Missile[SRBM-range 500 Km, dual-use], the Kinzhal  Hypersonic ALBM, and the Tochka-U Tactical Ballistic Missile [range-120 Km, dual-use]), it is apparent that the former has a plethora of vectors/nuclear warheads at its disposal. The current missiles in Russia’s arsenal are a mix of land/sea/sub-surface/air-launched vectors. While the tables/graphics above and below essentially suggest an overarching number of nuclear warheads, the current Oreshnik missile attack strongly suggests that Russia has the technology/wherewithal to mount conventional warheads on vectors that were hithertofore only considered to be nuclear-tipped.

In the above context, it would be worthwhile to mention that in March 2018, as part of his Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly, President Vladimir Putin announced six novel nuclear or dual-use (nuclear/conventional) weapon systems, popularly dubbed ‘super weapons’. These include the Avangard HGV, the Burevestnik nuclear-powered cruise missile, the Zircon scramjet-powered anti-ship hypersonic cruise missile, the Kinzhal hypersonic ALBM, the Sarmat ICBM and the Poseidon nuclear torpedo.

Russia has also heralded its ICBM modernisation program, where the SS-18 and SS-19 ICBMs will be replaced by the more modern silo-based, liquid-fuelled, three-stage RS-28 Sarmat (SSX-29/30) ICBM. Incidentally, the Sarmat has been given the moniker ‘Son of Satan’ because it is a follow-on to the SS-18 (NATO codename Satan)- presumably to reflect its extraordinary destructive capability. The Sarmat, with an operational range of 18,000 Km is viewed as a literal ‘heavyweight’ in the realm of ICBMs. It possesses a shorter boost-phase (to avoid boost-phase detection/interception) and is a Fractional Orbital Bombardment System (FOBS)-capable ICBM- this refers to the missile’s ability to utilise a Low Earth Orbit for warhead delivery with an enhanced operational range of 35,000 Km, thus complicating/mitigating interception. The ICBM can carry 16 warheads, including MIRVs and the Avangard HGV. The guidance system uses the Russian GLONASS Satellite Navigation System and astro-inertial navigation, the latter combination being unsusceptible to electromagnetic jamming.

Over the next decade, many Soviet-era ICBMs will also be replaced with variants of the RS-24 Yars (SS-29/SS-27 Mod 2) ICBM. This ICBM is also MIRV-capable and can carry three warheads. It has an operational range of 11,000 Km and uses similar navigation as the Sarmat. It is deployed in both silo-based and road-mobile versions.

In December 2023, Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu reported that the country’s nuclear triad was 95% modernised- an ominous sign for Russia’s neighbours.

Russia’s ICBMs:Source-defense-update.com

Estimated Status of Russia’s ICBM Forces: thebulletin.org

Note. SS-18 and SS-19 ICBMs will be replaced by SSX-29/30 Sarmat ICBM.

As is evident, Russia’s ground-launched vectors consist of a mix of silo-based and Transporter-Erector-Launcher (TEL)-based road-mobile ICBMs.  The development of the rail-mobile BZhRK Barguzin ICBM was halted due to financial constraints in 2017, however, the project could be re-opened by Russia at short notice. With a range of 12,600 Km, mounting from 1 to 16 warheads with reducing yield ( 5-16 MT for a single warhead) and inertial/astro-celestial/GLONASS navigation, the Barguzin would be a potential game-changer, in the mould of the now-decommissioned MIRV-capable RT-23 Molodets ICBM.

While the ALCMs and sea/sub-surface launched missiles would have inherent protection by way of mobility/dispersion, the dispersed deployment of Russia’s silo-based and road-mobile ICBMs also provide the dual advantages of survivability in a second-strike mode as well as the required dispersal against launch-site/inflight interception by air/surface launched vectors and BMD systems respectively. Add to this Russia’s 105,000 Km rail network, which would give a rail-mobile system extensive options for dispersal/deployment/launch.

Russia’s ICBM Deployment Sites (Estimated): Source-fas.org

Note. Avangard HGVs are currently being installed on a limited number of SS-19 Mod-4 vectors at Dombarovsky.

The Looming Threat to Europe and NATO

Use of ‘New-Age’ Vectors.  Russia’s employment of the Oreshnik in response to Ukraine’s use of US and EU munitions does not bode well for NATO and Europe. While Putin describes the Oreshnik launch as ‘experimental’, the retaliatory nature of the attack is not hidden. This, in the opinion of some experts, might just be heralding the advent of ‘new age’ IRBMs, with ranges up to 5000 Km, putting the whole of the European landmass within reach. Such incidents are only likely to grow, with Ukraine’s increasing use of NATO/US munitions for attacks on the Russian mainland. Further ‘provocation’ by Ukraine by use of imported weapon systems against Russia or being accorded NATO membership, might break the ‘glass-ceiling’, resulting in threat of an impending Russian missile attack on European soil outside Ukraine.

Russia’s Missile Reach. While the above-mentioned attacks are presently limited to Ukrainian soil, it would be prudent to state that all of Europe falls within reach of Russia’s missile arsenal, as most of the inventory of Russia’s nuclear/conventional missile triad (land/sea/air-launched) can reach all corners of Europe. Russia’s deployment of Iskander SRBMs in its far-west city of Kaliningrad puts Poland, parts of Eastern Germany, Southern Sweden, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, and a large part of the Baltic Sea directly within range. All this would imply Russia’s overarching ability/options for deployment with a wide range of vectors, representing an overbalance in Russia’s favour, which it could easily use as a coercive tool at the NATO bargaining table.

Source-missilethreat.csis.org

Coverage of Air/Sea-Launched Cruise Missiles and SRBMs over Europe:Source-reddit.com

Deployment Options and Numbers. Russia, by virtue of its extensive real-estate/multiple delivery systems and missile modernisation programs, enjoys substantial options for dispersal/deployment/survivability of its missile systems as explained earlier- an imperative that NATO and Europe can ill-afford to ignore, given the almost nine-fold factor by which Russia’s nuclear arsenal outnumbers that of Europe’s (Russia also holds the largest inventory of ballistic and cruise missiles in the world), and Russia’s now-demonstrated capability to mount conventional warheads on nuclear-compatible vectors!

Estimated Global Nuclear Warhead Inventories 2022: Source-fas.org

Note. Present estimates assess Russia’s operational nuclear weapons stockpile to be around 4380 warheads.

Nuclear Red-Lines. Russia last updated its nuclear deterrence policy in 2020, describing its nuclear redlines, which encompassed a ballistic missile/ nuclear attack on Russian/allied territory, a disruptive attack on Russia’s nuclear response architecture, or existential aggression with conventional weapons. Post Washington’s decision to allow Ukraine to fire the ATACMS into Russia, Putin announced changes to Russia’s nuclear doctrine last month, to include a justified nuclear response against: (1)  non-nuclear States, if backed by nuclear Nations in attacks on Russia/its allies; (2) States employing conventional strikes using ‘advanced weapons’, threatening Russia’s sovereignty/military capabilities and (3) an adversary, on detection of an imminent strategic/tactical missile launch.  This ‘tweaking’ of Russia’s nuclear doctrine provides ample operational space for a nuclear response against ‘aggressor States’, even if involved in a proxy role- an ordinance that puts Ukraine’s European and NATO allies at risk. At the very least, such nuclear signalling would aim to deter the US and NATO from interfering militarily in the ongoing conflict in Ukraine.

Deployment in Belarus. Russian nuclear rhetoric saw a spike in March 2023, when President Putin declared that Russia was completing construction of a ‘special storage facility for tactical nuclear weapons’ in Belarus- a country which shares 1084 Km of Ukraine’s Northern border. This allows ample real-estate/ deployment areas for a tactical nuclear strike by Russia into Ukraine. Further, deployment of IRBMs/ tactical nuclear weapons, as mentioned earlier, would also bring European countries in the immediate vicinity within range for a quick-response nuclear/conventional strike. Incidentally, Russia is believed to have modified 10 Belarusian Su-25 aircraft with the ability to deliver nuclear weapons and has moved Iskander launchers onto Belarusian soil.

Shift Towards Higher-Yield Missiles. The unavoidable attrition in numbers wrought on Russia’s conventional missile forces by their use in Ukraine ( evidenced by repurposing AD systems and use of expensive cruise missiles in place of SRBMs) may cause Russia to shift towards use of heavy-duty ICBMs at shorter ranges or to brandish the nuclear card against Ukraine/its NATO allies.

Concern Against Employment of US/EU BMD Systems.  Russia’s concern that the US/EU BMD systems deployed against the former might interfere (1) with Russia’s capability to retaliate to strikes originating from Ukraine/the European mainland or (2) with Russia’s capacity to enforce an ‘anti-access, area-denial’ umbrella over Russian territory/the war zone, might also cause Russia to ‘up the ante’ with use of heavier-yield conventional missiles or the threat of use of weapons of mass destruction.

Disregard for the New START Treaty. President Putin’s decision in 2023 to remove Russia from the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) with the US lends to nuclear opacity over Russia’s nuclear stockpiles, allowing the latter to increase the deployed numbers of its strategic vectors, possibly by up to 60%. Also, introduction of hitherto fore unknown missile systems such as the Oreshnik allows Russia to escape the attention of the New START Treaty (even if it is no longer a signatory), thereby mitigating rhetoric against such proliferation. This archetype is undesirable and would increase the imminence of nuclear threat over the European/US mainland.

Conclusion

After the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, the war in Ukraine has refocused the spotlight on Russia’s combat potential, with special reference to its ground/air forces and its missile arsenal. What is presently a war localised to two Nations, might quickly spread beyond manageable frontiers under the influence of the catalysts listed above. This could result in a kinetic strike/ the threat of attack against lands outside the Eastern Slavik boundaries- a virtual knife at Europe’s throat!

Cover Image: Source https://stock.adobe.com/

All the images on this article have been provided by the author