AS THE US SHIFTS FOCUS FROM TRANSATLANTIC TO INDO PACIFIC WHAT DOES IT MEAN FOR EUROPEAN SECURITY

Given the rhetorical emphasis on Making America Great Again (MAGA) during the recently held elections in which Donald trump emerged victorious, one is given to lookback on his isolationist policies during the previous term. In the same context the open verbal spat between Trump and Emmanuel Macron, in full view of international media, during the NATO conference of December 2019 comes to mind. In the 2016 Presidential Campaign, Trump had ruminated that the US allies and friends are ripping off the US financially. He has said that he will make the Europeans pay for their security. Donald trump has also made some controversial statements regarding the Russia Ukraine conflict, the most repugnant amongst these being Ukraine having to secede some territory to buy peace with Russia. Such statements have unnerved the European nations who see Russia as an existential threat but have, what some analysts call ‘Bonsai Armies,’ as they have traditionally banked on the US for security under the NATO framework.

There is a strong possibility of the US shifting focus from the Trans-Atlantic to Indo Pacific as the competition with China heats up. With the national debt rising and high inflation the US will be able to spare only finite resources for international security and these may be prioritised towards the Indo Pacific- which has emerged as the new theatre for geopolitical jousting with an assertive and aggressive China. Does this shift in US strategic priorities enjoin Europe to a serious think about its security? What does an isolationist America mean for NATO- the largest post WW II military alliance that has endured even after the Cold War? These questions assume greater gravity in view of the ongoing armed conflict between Russia and Ukraine since 2022 and how the conflict affects European Security.

What are the options available to Europe in the event of the US shifting focus and playing a less proactive role in European Security and the NATO? Who takes on the leadership role in ensuring European Security in the event of the US rescinding its transatlantic role? This article is an attempt to answer some of these issues.

Europe’s Security Approach

Europe has had a bloody history for most part of its existence. It is only for the last 75 years or so that it has enjoyed peace and prosperity. The destruction and ruination of Europe during the two world Wars was followed by the US Marshall Plan which ensured reconstruction and prosperity, whereas the NATO ensured peace and security throughout the Cold War and beyond. Since then, Europe has basked in comparative peace except for the episodic and short conflicts involving the splitting of Yugoslavia.

The 2022 Russia Ukraine Conflict once again not only returned the memories of war but has seemed to threaten the European Security like never before. This has stirred both the EU and the NATO into a range of actions.

In view of the current and unfolding geopolitical challenges, the EU has been attempting to strengthen its security and defence policies in line with the objectives of the Versailles Declaration and the 2022 Strategic Compass. The 2022 EU Strategic Compass gives out the blueprint of the plan designed to fortify the EU’s security and defence capabilities by 2030.

The primary aim of the Strategic Compass is to enhance the EU’s strategic autonomy and reinforce the EU’s role as a global security provider in concert with the US and Canada – its transatlantic partners. The Strategic Compass outlines four major points of action: Act, Secure, Invest, and Partner (European Union External Action, 2022). Under the “Act”, the EU pledges to enhance crisis response capabilities by raising a Rapid Deployment Capacity and improving its command and control structures. The “Secure” action emphasises “pre-emptive threat assessment”, bolstering intelligence capabilities, and fortifying cyber defence. The “Invest” action focuses investing in cutting-edge technologies to reduce dependencies on non-European sources and fill strategic gaps. Finally, the “Partner” action requires the EU to enhance cooperation with its crucial partners- NATO and the UN.

While the conflict in Ukraine has spurred the EU into action, it has also brought to the fore numerous limitations of the EU’s defence industry and the challenges. The main lacunae facing the defence industry in EU is its limited production capacity and the capital required to enhance this capacity. Till date the EU defence policy has relied excessively on external sources for critical materials and defence equipment and armament. To mitigate this challenge, French president Emmanuel macron, in Jan 2024 had urged the EU to adopt a war economy mode with a faster and stronger production capacity”. In fact, France’s strategic vision for EU’s security is not new; it originates from its 2017 Strategic Review of Defence and National Security and 2022 National Strategic Review.

Europe’s Tendency to bank on the US for its Security since the end of WW II

Against this backdrop of geopolitical uncertainty and aligned with the salient features of the 2017 and 2022 Strategic Reviews and the Versailles Declaration, France aims to address the EU’s overdependency on the US and its defence industry. French President Macron has been sufficiently vocal on the issue and has expounded his vision proactively towards improving EU’s defence readiness and reinforcing collective security efforts. France shares the security challenges faced by other EU members and as the only Nuclear Power of Europe, a UN Security Council member and a major economy has the capability of being the framework member for bolstering the EU Security. France’s actively contribution to shaping a unified European foreign and defence policy to foster a strong and influential EU also adds to its claim. Security analysts have called France a hesitant Atlanticist that has remained rooted in the Gaullist Mitterandist doctrine in their security policy approach. However, in a sharp contrast to many other EU members who have primarily relied on NATO- and by extension on the US for defence till date France has pursued a markedly different path. France’s approach, since her 1966 withdrawal from the integrated command structure of NATO reflects France’s commitment to bolstering her defence capabilities while still maintaining sovereign autonomy. While France rejoined the Trans- Atlantic alliance in 2009 and since maintained a significant role in the EU Defence, it has always been a staunch proponent of fortifying European defence through strategic alignments, partnerships with like-minded States, and resource allocation at the European level. France also advocates for European strategic autonomy and the need to acquire credible defence capabilities that complement NATO while upholding effective multilateral mechanisms grounded in international law.

Another noteworthy initiative by France to bolster European Defence capability has been the European Intervention Initiative launched on June 25, 2018. This initiative aims to develop a common strategic culture and the capability to conduct joint military operations within various multilateral frameworks such as the EU, NATO and UN to mitigate any crisis that has the potential of threatening European security. Nine European countries plus the UK (Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain) that have the military capabilities and political will to play a role at the global level have joined hands under this initiative.

Considerable differences have existed between France and Germany on the issue of European Security. While France advocates a European solution to the problem, Germany- which since WW II has not had a geopolitical and strategic conception of security has primarily depended on the US umbrella for security. This pacifist approach anchored in public consciousness is responsible for the scant investment in the German armed forces. Although, the Russian invasion of Ukraine, has changed the German conceptualisation of its international relations forcing it to come out with a security strategy, it predominantly remains national.

German Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s famous Zeitenwende speech of January 27, 2022, in the Bundestag reflects a changed analysis of the strategic landscape that has manifest itself through a €100 billion investment for the modernisation of her armed forces. This will primarily serve to fill capability gaps and hence enable Germany to fulfil its obligations toward its partners. However, the process of designing a security strategy, which complements that of its European partners remains mired in ambivalence. Some of the differences between France and Germany are so fundamental that they make cooperation between the two difficult.

For many European nations, the Russian invasion of Ukraine underscored the importance of NATO for European Security- and by extension of the US centrality to it, but not for France. France has been consistently advocating a Europe led approach to European Security. However, France’s approach suffers from unilateralism and doesn’t enjoy popular support within EU. There are distinct and significant differences in the approach of France and Germany- the other significant European player in terms of economic heft.

Way Forward for a Secure and Safe Europe

Strategic sovereignty remains the leitmotif of France’s EU policy. This was stated, during the French Presidency of the Council of the European Union in 2022, when the EU states, following a French proposal, mandated the Commission and the European Defence Agency to develop initiatives to enhance European defence capabilities under the aegis of the “Versailles Agenda”. At that time many members were dismissive of France’s singular focus on EU’s strategic sovereignty as not only being dogmatic but also noted that certain weapon systems and materials were simply not available in Europe to implement the Strategic sovereignty. However, the prolonging of the Russia Ukraine conflict and a change of administration in the US may force a rethink of their earlier positions. While some EU members may have been convinced by Paris’s logic, implementation of the idea of strategic sovereignty often encounters a road block for one reason or the other. The ambivalence of EU members and dithering in supporting Ukraine’s candidature to EU further confirms the infirmities in the EU Security policy as they realise well that once Ukraine is a member of EU, the article 42.7 of the EU Treaty requires the EU to actively take actions for the protection of Ukraine. However, the EU is not capable of guaranteeing this protection due to its own over reliance on the US. French Security objectives- with the European sovereignty being its hallmark, if accepted and implemented have the potential to remedy this situation in the years to come.

France’s Strategic review of 2017 and its subsequent editions of 2021 and 2022 have succinctly identified the need for France to prepare for high intensity conflicts. Nuclear deterrence has been an important pillar of French security policy to deter conflict with a major power. French armed forces have maintained their operational capabilities and gained valuable combat experience through deployments in the Sahel, Mali and Iraq. In contrast, the armed forces of other European nations have suffered in operational capability due to budget cuts, lack of threat perception and lack combat experience.

France had identified the US -China competition as a long-term geopolitical trend well in advance and predicted its effect on the transatlantic relationship this shift in US priorities to the Indo Pacific would have. However, France doesn’t aim to replace the NATO but developing intrinsic capabilities within Europe to face any challenges to European security. Enhancing the European military capabilities would allow the EU members to play an enhanced role in the alliance as also under the UN. Donald Trump has also demanded that the EU members share the security burden with the US. What France is saying will only help EU members to meet the transactional demands of the US under Donald Trump and bolster their capabilities to react to any security challenge. Importantly, if France and Germany’s differences can be overcome by political will, the Franco- German double engine can lead the European Security and make up for the US reprioritisation towards the Indo Pacific. Hopefully, the continued Russian challenge to Ukraine will spur the European nations to action.