• 10 December, 2024
Foreign Affairs, Geopolitics & National Security
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Strategic Fault Lines in the People’s Liberation Army

SHIVANSH SINGH, research associate Thu, 22 Aug 2024   |  Reading Time: 5 minutes

The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is the backbone of China’s military power, tasked with safeguarding the Communist Party’s control and advancing China’s global ambitions. Over recent decades, the PLA has transitioned from an infantry-based force to a modern military capable of joint operations across various domains. However, this rapid modernisation has unveiled strategic fault lines that could undermine the PLA’s effectiveness in achieving China’s national security objectives.
This article examines these strategic vulnerabilities, focusing on organisational challenges, technological gaps, civil-military integration, and geopolitical pressures. Understanding these issues is crucial to assessing the PLA’s capacity to support China’s broader strategic ambitions.

Historical Evolution of the PLA

The PLA was established in 1927 as the military arm of the Communist Party of China (CPC). Its early focus was on guerrilla warfare during the Chinese Civil War, leading to the creation of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949. Historically, the PLA was a large but poorly equipped force focused on territorial defence and internal stability. However, the need for modernisation became apparent in the 1980s, as China recognised the necessity of protecting its growing regional and global interests.
The PLA’s modernisation gained momentum in the 1990s and 2000s under Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, who prioritised creating a smaller, more professional, and technologically advanced military. President Xi Jinping’s 2015 military reforms further accelerated this transformation, aiming to streamline the PLA’s command structure, improve joint operations, and enhance power projection beyond China’s borders.
Despite these efforts, the PLA’s rapid modernisation has exposed several strategic vulnerabilities that could hinder its expanded role in China’s national security strategy.

Organisational Challenges

1. Centralisation vs. Flexibility
A significant organisational challenge within the PLA is the tension between centralisation and operational flexibility. The PLA’s command structure is highly centralised, with the Central Military Commission (CMC), chaired by the President of China, exercising direct control over the military. While this centralisation ensures loyalty to the Communist Party, it can also impede operational flexibility, especially in fast-moving combat scenarios where lower-level commanders need autonomy to make quick decisions. The rigid hierarchy often results in slower decision-making, which could be detrimental in conflicts requiring rapid responses.
2. Bureaucratic Inertia
Bureaucratic inertia within the PLA further complicates its operations. The PLA’s massive, deeply entrenched bureaucracy can slow the implementation of reforms and the adoption of new strategies and technologies. Despite the sweeping reforms under Xi Jinping, there is evidence that elements within the PLA resist change, preferring to maintain the status quo. This inertia is compounded by a culture of risk aversion and a focus on stability, stifling innovative thinking and limiting the PLA’s adaptability to new challenges.
3. Corruption and Patronage Networks
Corruption has long plagued the PLA, with senior officers using their positions to amass personal wealth and influence, creating patronage networks where promotions are based on personal connections rather than merit. Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign has targeted high-ranking officers, but concerns remain that corruption persists at lower levels. This could undermine the PLA’s effectiveness by promoting incompetence and eroding morale within the ranks.

Technological Gaps

1. Dependence on Foreign Technology
Despite significant investments in defence research and development, the PLA remains reliant on foreign technology, particularly from Russia and U.S., to fill critical capability gaps. This reliance is most evident in areas like jet engines, advanced radar systems, and submarine technology, where China has struggled to develop indigenous alternatives that match foreign counterparts. This dependency makes China vulnerable to supply chain disruptions and limits the PLA’s ability to innovate and develop unique capabilities.
2. Lag in Cyber and Information Warfare Capabilities
The PLA has made strides in cyber and information warfare but still lags behind advanced militaries like the United States in these critical areas. The PLA’s cyber capabilities focus primarily on espionage and defensive operations, with less emphasis on developing offensive capabilities that could disrupt enemy communications and command systems in a conflict. Additionally, the PLA’s information warfare capabilities, particularly in psychological operations and strategic communications, are less developed than those of its Western counterparts. This could limit the PLA’s ability to shape the information environment in modern warfare.
3. Challenges in Integrating Advanced Technologies
The PLA faces challenges in integrating advanced technologies like artificial intelligence (AI), unmanned systems, and precision-guided munitions into its force structure. These challenges include a lack of expertise, difficulties in integrating new technologies with existing platforms, and resistance from some quarters within the military to adopting disruptive technologies. Moreover, the PLA’s focus on rapid modernisation has sometimes led to premature deployment of new technologies before they are fully tested, risking operational failures and undermining combat effectiveness.

Civil-Military Relations

1. Civil-Military Integration (CMI) Challenges
Civil-Military Integration (CMI) is central to China’s military modernisation strategy, aiming to leverage civilian technological and industrial resources for the PLA’s development. However, CMI faces significant challenges, including bureaucratic obstacles, lack of coordination, and differing priorities between the military and civilian sectors. The PLA’s strict control over military technology can hinder innovation, while its opaque procurement processes complicate civilian companies’ involvement in military modernisation.
2. The Role of the Communist Party
The PLA’s dual role as a national military force and the armed wing of the Communist Party presents unique challenges in civil-military relations. The Communist Party maintains control over the PLA through political commissars embedded within military units to ensure adherence to party directives. While this system maintains party control, it can lead to tensions between military commanders and political commissars, particularly when military and political objectives diverge.
3. Public Perception and Legitimacy
The PLA’s public perception is a critical aspect of civil-military relations. While the PLA is generally respected in Chinese society, concerns are growing about its role in maintaining internal stability, particularly in regions like Xinjiang and Tibet. The PLA’s involvement in domestic security operations can undermine its legitimacy if perceived as heavy-handed, potentially leading to a loss of public support, which is vital for social stability and military effectiveness.

Geopolitical Pressures

1. Strategic Overextension
As China seeks to expand its global influence, the PLA faces the challenge of strategic overextension. The PLA is increasingly tasked with securing China’s interests in distant regions like the South China Sea, the Indian Ocean, and Africa, stretching its resources and capabilities. The PLA’s focus on regional security, particularly regarding Taiwan and the South China Sea, has led to an overemphasis on anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) systems at the expense of more versatile, expeditionary capabilities. This could limit the PLA’s ability to respond to emerging threats beyond its immediate periphery.
2. Rising Regional Tensions
The PLA’s actions in the South China Sea, along the Sino-Indian border, and in the Taiwan Strait have heightened regional tensions and increased the likelihood of conflict with neighbouring countries. These tensions have prompted neighbouring nations to strengthen their military capabilities and seek closer security ties with the United States and other powers, potentially undermining China’s strategic objectives. The PLA’s aggressive posture in these regions has also contributed to the perception of China as a threat, which could diplomatically isolate China and increase the likelihood of military confrontation.
3. The US-China Strategic Competition
The strategic competition between the United States and China is perhaps the most significant geopolitical pressure facing the PLA. The U.S. remains the dominant military power in the Asia-Pacific region, and its network of alliances poses a significant challenge to China’s ambitions. The PLA’s modernisation has been largely driven by the need to counter U.S. military capabilities, but the U.S. maintains a technological and operational edge, particularly in areas like stealth technology, long-range precision strike, and integrated joint operations. The intensifying rivalry between the two nations increases the risk of military confrontation, particularly in hotspots like the South China Sea and Taiwan.

Conclusion

The PLA, despite its rapid modernisation and growing global influence, faces significant strategic fault lines that could undermine its effectiveness in achieving China’s national security objectives. Organisational challenges, technological gaps, civil-military integration issues, and geopolitical pressures highlight the complex nature of the PLA’s role in China’s strategic ambitions. Addressing these vulnerabilities will be crucial for the PLA’s future trajectory and its ability to support China’s rise as a global power. Continued analysis of these strategic fault lines is essential for understanding the evolving dynamics of global military power and the implications for international security.


Author
Shivansh Singh, a master's in Defence and Strategic Studies, interned at the Centre for Air Power Studies, (CAPS), where he had published an article in the Forum for national security studies- Blue Yonder Journal. Currently, he is employed as a research associate at Chanakya Forum.

Disclaimer

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